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Over the years in an attempt to create cost savings,
the Navy has changed its ways of determining parts
allowances. Originally, the Navy used Demand Based
Allowancing, in which parts allowances were assigned based
upon Original Equipment Manufacturer recommendations, and
fleet demand. In the late 1980' s, the Navy changed its
parts allowancing to Readiness Based Sparing.
During this same time, the parts managers at the Navy
Inventory Control Points (ICPs) have received reduced
funding for parts support. As a result, parts have been
transferred from one deploying unit to the next deploying
unit
.
This thesis studied the possibility of using incentive
contract types in an attempt to ensure the allowances
provided to the fleet are accurate and meaningful.
Additionally, the use of an incentive-type contract can be
used to ensure the parts required to fill the assigned
allowances are available to the fleet at Material Support
Date (MSD)
.
This study conducted a comparative analysis of past
(post MSD) and present (at MSD) weapon systems to identify
costs and benefits associated with the use of incentive-
type contracts. Lastly, this study identified a system
that has not reached MSD (future) which could possibly
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Over the years, major weapon systems allowancing
procedures and techniques have changed. Initially, spare
part allowances were computed through the use of a Demand
Based System (DBS) . A system which, through the repair and
usage of parts, an allowance quantity was determined to
fulfill a unit's requirements for a period of time. In the
late 1980s, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) , conducted a
study to determine the best mix of parts, given a funding
limitation. The study concluded with the invention of an
allowancing system known as Readiness Based Sparing (RBS)
.
This algorithmic system, used in conjunction with fiduciary,
aircraft mix and Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance
Department (AIMD) supportability constraints, predicts the
best mix of "low-costing" Sub-Repairable Assemblies (SRAs)
needed to maintain a minimum number of "high-costing" Weapon
Repairable Assemblies (WRAs)
.
RBS was developed to help sustain Chief of Naval
Operation's (CNO's) aircraft readiness levels and was
estimated to save approximately $30 million per Aviation
Consolidated Allowance Listing (AVCAL) 1 . Since its
inception, allowances associated with major aviation weapon
Center for Naval Analysis CAB 93-16/September 1993
systems have been established using RBS. Throughout the
years, even the use of RBS has been questioned by senior
officials
.
This thesis investigates the feasibility of using a
combination of data rights and incentive contracting in an
attempt to predict accurate and reliable spare parts
allowancing. If. successful, this strategy has the potential
to save money, decrease major weapon systems down time, and
increase the reliability of spare parts allowancing.
B. PURPOSE
In today's austere funding, Type Commanders (TYCOMs)
have attempted to use funding of backordered initial
outfitting spare parts to fund operational commitments/
This has resulted in a shortage of available parts required
for fully outfitting today's aircraft carrier fleets.
Today, in a carrier/air wing work up schedule, the TYCOM is
forced to screen and transfer all available parts from non-
deployed carriers, to fulfill outstanding spare parts
requirements for the deploying carrier and its associated
air wing.
This study will review the possibility of using
incentive contracts in an attempt to ensure allowances
provided to the fleet are accurate and meaningful.
1 COMNAVSUPSYSCOM message dtd 221430Z May 97 (Subj.: FHP SAVINGS
INITIATIVE)
.
Secondarily, an incentive-type contract can be used to
ensure the parts required to fill the assigned allowances






Can the U.S. Navy achieve a realistic AVCA1 sufficient
to support the fleet, by using a combination of contractor
suggested allowances and incentive-type contracts?
2 . Secondary :
• How does the U.S. Navy currently calculate initial
outfitting allowances?
• How does the U.S. Navy currently fund initial
outfitting allowances?
• What is Material Support Date (MSD) and why is it so
important?
• How does the incentive-type contract work?
• How will the use of an incentive-type contract
differ from how the U.S. Navy currently does
business?
• What are the negative effects of using an incentive-
type contract for initial outfitting?
• What will be the estimated cost or savings from
using an incentive-type contract?
• Does an incentive-type contract provide a "fair and
equitable" contract, beneficial to both the
Government and commercial suppliers?
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The scope of this study will include: (1) an overview
of the Navy's Weapon System procurement policy, (2) an
overview of the Navy's Weapon System budgetary process, (3)
an in-depth review of the Navy's initial outfitting
allowance policy, (4) a model study of three separate weapon
systems and the applicability of an incentive-type contract,
and (5) an interview with commercial suppliers of weapon
systems concerning the applicability and acceptability of an
incentive-type contract for parts support.
This study will use the following methodology to
answer the primary and secondary research questions:
1. Conduct a thorough review of U.S. Navy policies
governing the procurement of new weapon systems.
2. Conduct a thorough review of U.S. Navy policies
governing the budgetary process of new weapon systems (A key
point in determining MSD and fielding equipment to the
fleet) .
3. Conduct a thorough review of U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps policies governing outfitting allowances.
4.
Prepare an incentive-type contract which could be
used in establishing allowances and parts support to the
fleet.
5. Conduct a model study of three weapon systems,
comparing current readiness to a proposed readiness using an
incentive-type contract.
6. Evaluate the costs and benefits of using incentive-
type contracts to assign allowances and provide initial
outfitting parts support.
7. Identify potential problems between the Government
and commercial suppliers of weapon systems when using an
incentive-type contract for parts support.
E . ORGANIZATION
This study is organized in such a way, that the reader
receives a full spectrum view of the development of
allowancing procedures and current processes used to ensure
parts support and availability for deployed U.S. Naval
Forces
.
The review will start with the establishment of demand
based allowancing, proceed through the RBS process and
answer the questions of how and why the U.S. Navy changed
its allowancing policies. Lastly, with the introduction of
an incentive-type contract model, a comparison will be made
between cost avoidance and spare parts availability. This
comparison will attempt to prove the incentive-type
contracting method can instill confidence in spare parts
allowances and eventually take the guess work out of setting
fleet AVCAL allowances.
F. CHAPTER REVIEW
This chapter provided background information on how the
U.S. Navy has changed its process in determining and
developing repair parts allowances in support of aviation
units assigned aboard aircraft carriers and naval air
stations. A brief description has been given on each of the
evolving processes, and how senior officers in the aviation
commands have dealt with past repair part shortfalls.
Later chapters of this thesis will provide more detail
into each process and their respective advantages and
disadvantages. Detailed information on the U.S. Navy's
budgeting process will be explained, as this may be a key
determinant in the evolving allowancing process.
Finally, this chapter provided the primary and
secondary research questions of this thesis and how their
eventual answers can be theoretically beneficial to creating
an allowancing process that is both economically feasible
and reliable. Additionally, the answers to these questions
may lead to the development of a model which provides a fair
and equitable deal for all players in the procurement and
support system of tomorrow.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE NAVY'S DEMAND BASED ALLOWANCING PROCESS
A. THE NAVY'S BUDGETARY PROCESS
The Navy's budgetary process is but a single piece of
the puzzle known as the Federal Budget Process. This
process is referred to as the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) . PPBS is the primary resource
management process in the Department of Defense (DoD) , and
is the cornerstone to any purchase that is conducted. PPBS
is a cyclical process that is unique to the DoD and was
originally introduced by Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara in 1962. It combines the three distinct but
interrelated phases of planning, programming and budgeting.
During the planning stage, the Navy must focus on:
• Defining the national military strategy necessary to
help maintain national security and support DoD and
U.S. foreign policy for the next seven years.
• Planning the integration and balancing of military
forces required to accomplish the above strategy.
• Ensuring the proper priorities are assigned to those
requirements, in order to manage DoD resources
effectively in cases of national resource
limitations
.
During the programming stage, the Navy develops a list
of proposed programs which are required to support the
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forces required to accomplish the above strategy.
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During the programming stage, the Navy develops a list
of proposed programs which are required to support the
decisions, directions and strategy of the Secretary of
Defense. These programs are gathered and compiled as the
Navy's Program Objectives Memoranda (POM). The POM
translates the results of the DoD planning into a rational,
six-year defense program within available resources.
The budgeting stage POMs are reviewed and forwarded by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) , to the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) . 0MB then reviews all
Federal inputs and incorporates requirements into the
President's Budget, to be submitted to Congress in February

























Figure 2-1 PBBS INPUTS AND PHASES
Source: INTRODUCTION TO DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT,
THIRD ED. JUNE 1996
Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management; Third Ed. June 1996
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As shown in Figure 2-1 above 4 , once the President has
forwarded his budget to Congress for review, the process of
hearings, passing of legislation, apportionment must occur
before one penny of Government funding can be obligated and
expended. The process that Congress goes through is also a
lengthy one. Primarily, Congress must carefully assess
whether a change in taxes or a cut in reguirements is
reguired in order to fulfill our Nation's reguirements, as
listed in the President's proposed budget.
As one can see, the act of funding any reguirement in
the Navy reguires careful and thoughtful insight to our
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Figure 2-2 PBBS PHASES IN CALENDAR FORMAT
Source: INTRODUCTION TO DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT,




Program Managers of weapon systems must look far into the
future to determine the fiscal requirements of providing
logistics spares for the weapon systems of tomorrow.
B. THE NAVY'S PROCUREMENT POLICY
Another process which requires adequate planning, time
and effort, is the Navy's procurement policy for major
system acquisitions. The process begins with the generation
of requirements based on a continuing policy of assessing
the capabilities of the current force structure to meet the
projected threat, while taking into account the
opportunities for technological advancement, cost savings,
and changes in national policy or doctrine.
As shown in Figure 2-3, all of the above factors are
incorporated into decisions for the future, and a Mission
Need Statement (MNS) for the Navy is generated. The MNS
identifies deficiencies in the Navy's posture or the
possible opportunity to introduce new capabilities into the
Navy's force structure. Once all requirements have been
reviewed for similarities, alternatives, and the best
concept has been identified, the Navy will generate an
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) . Eventually, a






























INPUTS INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MISSION NEED STATEMENT
Source: INTRODUCTION TO DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT,
THIRD ED. JUNE 1996
approve the MNS. Approval identifies the completion of the
validation process and confirms the need for a material
solution. At this point, the validating authority will
determine the joint possibilities, and then will forward the
MNS to the appropriate Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)
for Milestone (Concept Exploration) review. The flow of
the MNS from the originator to the approval authority is
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Figure 2-4 FLOW OF MISSION NEED STATEMENT
Source: INTRODUCTION TO DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT,
THIRD ED. JUNE 1996
At this point in time, the acquisition of a major
weapon system has started its way down the path to concept
exploration, and eventually to fielding, as shown in Figure
2-5. However, as stated earlier, this process is one that
can take as many as 10 to 20 years. The issue of
determining, fielding and procuring logistical spare parts
is one which requires foresight, planning and money.
One of the single most important issues concerning
spare parts procurement and funding is the way money is
allocated and authorized for spending by Congress. Each
"pot" of money is assigned to be used for specific purposes.













































Figure 2-5 PHASES OF A MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM
Source: INTRODUCTION TO DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT,
THIRD ED. JUNE 1996
colors." Because of the unique assignment of "colored
money," key events in the milestone process must occur or
funding will not be available for spending. For example, in
procuring spare parts, the key event is known as the
Material Support Date (MSD) . At MSD, Navy item managers
"take control" of ensuring sufficient parts support to the
fleet. This process is done with the use of a different
"color" of money, than prior to MSD. Initial outfitting
spares are purchased with APN-6 (Aviation Procurement, Navy)
dollars, while replenishment spares are purchased with O&MN
(Operations and Maintenance, Navy) dollars.
One might ask, "I don't see the impact?" The main
concern is that funding is planned for an event, MSD, to
take place at a time in the future. Funding is planned with
15
the proper amount of pre- and post- MSD "colored" funding.
If MSD slips, there is no longer sufficient funds to support
the slippage, and the post-MSD funding cannot be used,
because the MSD event has not taken place. As one can see,
although the procurement process is event driven, the PPBS
process makes it very difficult to accommodate unforeseen
changes, even ones as simple as a slippage in MSD.
C. THE ALLOWANCING PROCESS
The Navy's Demand Based, fixed protection model, (DBS),
computes spare parts requirements one component at a time
without regard to aircraft readiness or inventory cost. The
spares requirements calculated for one part is independent
of the requirement calculated for another part. DBS takes
into account supply, maintenance, and off-ship resupply
functions, using force levels, operating tempo, failure
rates, repair capabilities, turn around times, and resupply
times. With all of the above variables included in
calculating allowances, DBS is a requirements method that
selects what is needed to satisfy demand and insure against
never having zero ready for issue (RFI) assets when needed 6 .
A sample of the DBS, also known as RIMAIR, calculation is
shown in Appendix A. 7
Center for Naval Analysis briefing CAB 94-75 of January 1995.
NAVICP operations Policy and Procedures Memorandum #231A of 22 Nov
1994.
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D. RATIONALE FOR MOVING FROM DEMAND BASED TO READINESS BASED
ALLOWANCING
As shown previously, the cost of doing business
tomorrow must be planned for in excess of one year in
advance. As defense procurement budgets dwindle, logistical
support for naval aviation has had to create a better way of
supporting the front line fighter with less. As a result of
the Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 901, the
Department of Defense mandated that all Inventory Control




The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conducted their
first at-sea study of RBS on the USS AMERICA in August of
1993. CNA concluded from that study that Chief of Naval
Operation's (CNO's) Mission Capable/Fully Mission Capable
(MC/FMC) readiness rates as published in the OPNAVINST
5442. 4M (see Appendix B) , could be attained at a cost
savings of $33 million. CNA in their brief of January 1995,
describes RBS as a good way for Chief of Naval Operation's
staff (OPNAV) budgeters to offset anticipated deficits in
outfitting budgets.
In the end, the Navy changed its policy and procedures
in outfitting spare parts for two reasons. First, the CAN
NAVICP operations Policy and Procedures Memorandum #231A of 22 Nov
1994
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provided evidence that shifting to RBS outfitting could save
in excess of $33 million per AVCAL. Second, upon being
provided this information, DoD mandated all AVCALs be
created using the RBS technigue. The bottom line comes down
to a possible cure for a lack of funding.
E . CHAPTER REVIEW
This chapter provided a brief overview of the Navy's
Demand Based Allowancing Process. It has shown the process
of identifying how major weapon systems are presented,
reviewed, accepted and approved by the senior leaders of the
Department of Defense. It attempted to show how long and
drawn out the process of funding approved weapon systems and
the support required after they are fielded and the
importance of the different "colors'7 of money.
Additionally, this chapter described the DBS process where
spare parts allowancing was conducted on a part by part
analysis, independent of the allowances of related or
supporting parts. Lastly, this chapter briefly described
that the U.S. Navy shifted from conducting allowances from
DBS to RBS, due to a lack of "expected" funding shortfalls
in the future.
The next chapter will discuss RBS allowance analysis,
development and associated problem areas, and how RBS can
possibly be executed more efficiently.
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE NAVY'S READINESS BASED ALLOWANCING
PROCESS
A. CHANGES IN THE NAVY'S ALLOWANCE PROCESS
The previous chapters have briefly explained the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process
and the way the U.S. Navy created and assigned repair parts
allowances for Aviation Consolidated Allowance Lists
(AVCALs) . These chapters have expounded on the long drawn
out process of approval for funding future requirements.
Additionally, the previous chapters noted that the aviation
repair parts allowancing process was somewhat "myopic, " in
that each part was allowanced independent of supporting
subassemblies
.
Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) has been proclaimed by
the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) as the best way to
offset anticipated deficits in outfitting budgets and assist
Chief of Naval Operations staff (OPNAV) budget analysts
manage the PBBS process and funds execution. 9 Appendix C
shows how the DoD procurement budget has declined over the
years; only recently have procurement dollars been
increased. However, the Secretary of Defense, John Dalton
in his report to Congress, noted the following difficulty in
funding investment/modernization accounts: 10
' CNA Briefing CAB 94-75 of January 1995
Report of the Secretary of Defense found at
http: //www. dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/chapl 8 . html
.
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Since 1988, the Department allowed the
weapons modernization accounts to decrease while
the force was restructured to meet post-Cold War
requirements. Additionally, unanticipated
contingency and other unplanned operating expenses
caused a steady migration of funds from the
investment accounts to Operation and Maintenance
operating accounts. This lower level of
investment initially was appropriate as the force
was right-sized by retirement of older equipment
and systems. Now, equipment has aged to the point
that replacement is needed, but the level of
procurement expenditures is inadequate. An
increase to at least $54 billion annual
procurement in 2000 is needed to achieve the
required balance towards a goal of $60 billion in
2001.
Each RBS AVCAL has been proclaimed to provide the same
amount of readiness for aviation as with previous Demand
Based System (DBS) AVCALs, but at a $34 million cost
savings. In comparing RBS and DBS AVCALs, CNA used an
Aviation Logistics Model (ALM) to obtain the cost-to-
























05 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.6 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.68
FMC rate
Figure 3-1 ALTERNATIVE AVCALS: READINESS VERSUS COST
Source: CAN BRIEFING CAB 94-75 OF JANUARY 1995
CNA Briefing CAB 94-75 of January 1995
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the ALM as a computer simulation that takes into account,
day-for-day transactions and computes Fully Mission Capable
(FMC) rates and on hand available allowances for a DBS
AVCAL, and then compares these projections with the actual
numbers reported by RBS AVCAL units.
One might argue that a decrease in actual parts, as a
result of funding shortfalls, must create a degradation of
readiness. The ability to increase or maintain readiness
with less funding, lies in the proper mix of parts included
in the AVCAL production. The RBS model assigns allowances
based on the infrastructure support of lower assembly repair
parts, and the ability of the Air Intermediate Maintenance
Department (AIMD) to repair Weapon Repairable Assemblies
(WRAs) . On the first ever AVCAL, RBS computations allowed
the inclusion of 343 more line items than would have been
used in a DBS AVCAL. The added components were those low
costing Sub Repairable Assemblies (SRAs) needed to correct
failures in the high costing WRAs, whose allowances had been
decreased (as cost avoidance) . Appendix D provides a Sample
RBS Calculation.
B. PROBLEMS THAT RBS CREATED
Supply officers and maintenance officers, located both
at intermediate and organizational levels, have built over
the years a vast level of knowledge on how to support an
21
embarked airwing. With the advent of RBS, these managers
had to not only learn the new RBS model, but had to learn
the limits of their people and supported weapon systems.
Supply Departments now had to track the logistics
routes for any possible mission the battle group could be
assigned. Precious Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) funds
had to be expended to place senior enlisted personnel at key
points along the logistic routes. The days of submitting a
priority replacement requisition into the system and
awaiting its arrival was no longer possible. Additionally,
"excess" spare parts kept onboard to cover requirements
while requisitioned parts are in-transit, were no longer
available. RBS had taken those parts off in its cost versus
readiness decision table.
Type Commanders and their staff set up matrices to
track each and every high priority requisition on a 24 hour
basis. Questions such as:
• Is the part available?
• Where is it in the logistics train?
• Why has the part been sitting at the Air Force
Terminal for two days?
• Why hasn't the ship received the part? They are in
the same port as the part.
22
• If the part is not available, why aren't we
expediting the cannibalization of the part from the
Fleet Reserve Air Group (FRAG)?
Questions like these were now asked by admirals in
charge of fleet forces. Answers to each of these questions
and related questions were provided in person on a daily
basis, and via facsimile to the Pentagon at the Chief of
Naval Operation's (CNO's) office.
Maintenance Officers now had to ensure that all of the
"I" (intermediate) level support equipment was available and
useable onboard the deploying carrier. Extensive training
of all personnel had to be accomplished, in all fields
possible. The RBS AVCAL did not allow for slack. In
computing the new allowances, RBS computations took into
account the level of manning, the benches which were
supposed to be onboard and up and running, and the training
requirements that were to be achieved for each carrier.
Problems arise from the differences in the paper "should be"
numbers used in computing new RBS allowances, and the
factual numbers of the equipment, men, training and parts
available for a deploying carrier and supporting its
embarked airwing.
In the three months prior to deployment of a carrier
and its embarked airwing, the TYCOM supply and maintenance
staff work continually to achieve the "should be" numbers.
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Every step is taken, from expediting stock requisitions in
the supply system, to cross decking spare parts from all the
"non-deployed" carriers and air stations, to cannibalization
of perfectly good aircraft and test benches to ensure the
success of the men and women onboard the deployed carrier.
In 1995, in excess of 1,700 parts were cross decked from
"non-deployed" carriers and air stations to support the
carrier getting ready to deploy. 12
In December of 1994, CNA reported the follow as lessons
learned:
Readiness is achieved from all integrated
logistics support (ILS) resources — supply,
maintenance, manning, and rear-echelon support.
The supply resources are usually the last ones to
be calculated using critical data that define all
the other ILS resources. There are many ways to
balance the ILS equation to achieve the desired
level of readiness. Resource allocators choose
how this is done. We have shown RBS is a tool
resource allocators can use to cut supply costs
without reducing readiness or altering other
support resources.
What can be perceived from this statement and from
factual numbers, are the issues of creating a fictional
"clean" and supportive AVCAL, in a realistic environment
where 100 percent manning, training and support is not
attainable in todav' s "riaht-sized" armed forces.
Information presented is based upon the author' s experience as tl
Head cf the COMNAVAIRPAC Expediting Division from 1995-1996, and
Readiness Officer aboard USS Kitty Hawk from April- June 1996.
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The CNA studies and Type Commander presentations also
show an increase in the number of on-board cannibalizations
and Beyond the Capability of Maintenance (BCM) actions.""
All of the above problems are real, because of a non-
realistic algorithm incorporated to create savings in an era
of less procurement dollars (as shown in Appendix C)
.
History has shown that spare parts support becomes more
critical to readiness as weapon systems age and defense
modernization/investment budgets decline.
C. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH RBS
As discussed above, the RBS model was perceived to be
the answer to the budgeters nightmare of insufficient funds
for the future. However, RBS is built on the premise of a
"perfect" world, where the supporting infrastructure is
available to support a long logistics pipeline and reported
data is complete, current, and accurate. It also assumes
that if a Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rate is attained, then
the matrix measurement of the Mission Capable (MC) rate is
attained. This assumption is incorrect. The following
example provides proof.
The OPNAVINST 5440. 2M (Appendix B)
,
provides an MC/FMC
goal for the E-2C of 70/54 percent. Three aircraft are
assigned to a carrier for deployment. Assume one aircraft
13 COMNAVAIRPAC brief of USS KITTY HAWK' s RBS AVCAL from June- Dec 1994
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is down for a part which has a "long" lead time. Squadron
and shipboard maintainers will continually cannibalize this
down aircraft, in an attempt to maintain the remaining two
aircraft in a fully mission capable status. As a result,
the MC/FMC rate will be 66/66. The fully mission capable
rate was attained, however the mission capable rate was not.
Under the above scenario, which is not uncommon during
deployments, it is evident that meeting FMC does not
guarantee MC goals will be met.
In a Navy where promotion is built on what you can
achieve with less and how much you can save the Department
of Defense, one must look hard at the realistic
attainability of MC and FMC goals. Squadrons are going to
do whatever they have to meet all the missions assigned to
them, even if it means missing the MC or FMC goal. CNA
admittedly reported that the RBS study accomplished onboard
USS AMERICA, in 1993-1994 was a success. However;
...modeling analysis compares a pure RBS inventory
with a pure demand-based inventory. By pure, we
mean that all the recommended inventory quantities
are physically on board the carrier at the
beginning of the deployment scenario. We know
that this doesn't happen in reality. In fact,
when AMERICA left Norfolk, 82 percent of the RBS
WRAs had an actual on hand quantity equal to the
recommended RBS quantity../ 4
u CNA study, CRM 94-140 of December 1994
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This study is not attempting to say RBS is wrong. This
study is merely pointing out the fact that, in order to make
assumptions in creating an RBS AVCAL, one must either take
into account our imperfect world of inadequate funding
and/or the fact that not all recommended parts are available
for supporting the front line war fighters. Making these
assumptions up front, have forced the fighting sailor and
airman to create problems which were not previously present.
The key variable to the success of our sailors and RBS
is the availability of spare parts. The lack of funding to
provide spare parts has created a problem of its own. The
desire and want of rear-echelon commands to ensure the
proper support of their fellow sailors on deployment have
lead to a skyrocketing cannibalization rate. In a recent
congressional hearing a First Class Petty Officer from
Tactical Electronics Warfare Squadron (VAQ) 131 stated, "The
lack of spare parts has reached such a low point some young
sailors believe that the spare parts are suppose to come
from the aircraft instead of the warehouse." 10 However, not
only is the young sailor aware of this problem. The
Commanding Officer of the same squadron reported,
...during a six-month deployment...the readiness
of his squadron eroded the longer the unit was
deployed because of spare parts and equipment
problems...The squadron kept flying by trading parts
between aircraft. 16
3 Navy Times, Spare Parts Shortage Hurts Fleet-Working Harder to do
Less, 23 March 1998.
16 Ibid.
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Lastly, the Commanding Officer of the United States Navy'
s
most elite and superior fighter/attack aircraft, Fighter-
Attack Squadron (VFA) 113 reported, "...[the squadron is] due
to deploy aboard the carrier Abraham Lincoln and is expected
to deploy on 96-hour notice, but could only do so only by
taking equipment from other squadrons." 17
As noted above, an increased rate of cannibalization of
non-deployed aircraft is a direct result of RBS and austere
Operation and Maintenance budgets. The next question will
be,
"How long can we keep doing this?"
D. CHAPTER REVIEW
This chapter took an in-depth look at how a lack of
funding in the area of defense procurement had an impact in
the Navy' s procedures in calculating aviation spare part
allowances. It provided the step-by-step process that is
used in creating the RBS model allowances, and how key
personnel must chose cost over readiness. Additionally,
this chapter presented the many problems that RBS created.
Problems such as the new management practices that supply
and maintenance officers must incorporate, in an attempt to
ensure the safety of our pilots and our Nation, to the high
cannibalization rate, which has spread throughout the Navy,
17 ibid,
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in a dire attempt to support the fleet- Lastly, this
chapter has identified the number one issue in the fleet
today, and the number one reason why RBS might fail in the
future. The primary reason for the current lack of bench
support, higher cannibalization rates, and cross decking of
parts is the lack of spare parts required to support the
fleet. The lack of spare parts is caused by the inherent
lack of planning for sufficient procurement funding for the
future, and the constant transfer of funds from the
procurement/logistics funds to the operational funding
accounts of today.
The next chapter will present the use of an acquisition
tool called the incentive contract, and how incentive
contracting combined with acquisition reform can be used to





IV. INTRODUCTION OF THE INCENTIVE -TYPE CONTRACT
A. HOW DOES THE INCENTIVE -TYPE CONTRACT WORK
In his book Federal Acquisition and Contract
Management, Hearn discusses the subject of incentive
contracting with the following: 1.
The profit motive is the real essence of
incentive contracting. There is an implied
assumption by the [G] overnment that a contractor
will have more motivation in performing the
contract if there is a chance to increase profits.
By accepting an incentive contract the contractor
is agreeing, at least superficially, with the
[G] overnment
.
Therefore the objective in an incentive
contract is to motivate the contractor or
subcontractor to earn more profit. The added
earnings will be gained by achieving better
performance and controlling costs. Such results
are in the best interest [s] of both the prime
contractor and the [G] overnment . The technique is
to adjust the contractor's profit by comparing the
value of the completed contract to the cost and
performance goals set in the contract. The profit
adjustments may be positive (i.e., reward),
negative (i.e. penalty) or a combination of the
two
.
As one can see, an incentive-type contract is built on
the premise of providing a goal for the contractor to
attain. One or many goals can be established, but as with
any contract between two parties, the goal must be agreed
upon by both parties and achievable by the accepting party.
18 Hearn, Emmett E. , Federal Acquisition and Contracting Management,
pp. 84-85.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation states 19 :
...required supplies or services can be acquired at
lower costs and, in certain instances, with
improved delivery or technical performance, by
relating the amount of profit or fee payable under
the contract to the contractor's performance.
Incentive contracts are designed to obtain
specific acquisition objectives by—
(1) Establishing reasonable and attainable targets
that are clearly communicated to the
contractor; and
(2) Including appropriate incentive arrangements
designed to—
(i)motivate contractor efforts that might not
otherwise be emphasized and
(ii) discourage contractor inefficiency and
waste
.
In combining the FAR with Hearn' s statement, a conclusion
can be made that an incentive-type contract provides a goal
or target for the contractor to attain. The target is
usually set by the buyer, as a key goal required in
attaining the proper outcome. In the instance of logistics
support, the possible targets could range from a desired
Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MBTF)
, to the specific number of
components produced and delivered within a certain time
frame. The contracting officer in today's environment of
acquisition reform is at liberty and encouraged to create
any number of incentives and targets in an attempt to attain
specified goals. The combinations are limitless, and the
possible gains to both the contractor and the Government may
be in our best interest. In the words of Dr. Kaminski,
"Well-structured contracts and well-designed contract
' Defense Acquisition Deskbook, FAR 16.4, of December 1997
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incentive [s] ...are key in focusing contractor attention on
cost reduction."""'
B. THE BESEN-TERASAWA MODEL AND ITS USE WITH LOGISTICS
SUPPORT
At this point in the thesis, I would like to introduce
a model study which has been produced and theoretically
proven (See Appendix E) . The model is called the Bonus
Incentive Recruiting Model (BIRM) , in which the problem of
determining the correct number of recruiting quotas to
assign to different regions and personnel is studied. The
goals of the bonus incentive recruiting model are as
follows r" 1
• Provides an incentive for recruiters to surpass
quotas and thereby maximize true market potential.
• Rewards recruiters with monetary bonuses based on
their work effort and their ability to forecast.
• Rewards recruiters equitably despite inherent
regional market differences in the long run.
• Provides, in the long run, United States Army
Recruiting Command (USAREC) headquarters with
valuable market information that allows for
20 Dr. Paul Kaminski, Reducing Life Cycle Costs for New and Fielded
Systems, 4 Dec 1995.
Terasawa, Kang, Qv
Recruiting Model, Oct 12, 1996.
uota Based Recruiting System and Bonus Incentive
efficient future resource reallocation to the
productive regions.
• Based on improved forecasting information, the bonus
model indirectly reduces staff workload and
minimizes the variance in the mission process.
• Model is adjustable to reflect changing Army
accession requirements.
• Model is capable of maintaining quality marks.
The Besen-Terasawa study concludes that creating a bonus
payment (incentive-type) table"" provides the benefits to
both the recruiting command and the recruiter. The key to
the table is the recruiter's self assessed "predicted"
requirements (goals) . Maximum bonus is assigned if the
recruiter attains the exact amount as his self assigned
prediction. If the recruiter attains higher than his
prediction, the bonus is high, but less than if exactly
predicted. Conversely, if the recruiter attains less than
predicted, the bonus is low, and even less than if he had
over attained his predicted goal.
One can see the similarities between the incentive
contract used in acquisition, and the Besen-Terasawa
incentive model for recruiting. The key difference between
The "mechanism" incorporated in the incentive table was originally
developed by Osband and Reichelstein.
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the Besen-Terasawa model and the incentive contract is that
the Government sets the targets for goals it wishes the
contractor to attain. Granted, however, the contractor must
approve of the targets prior to accepting the contract.
This study proposes that in the future we use the
incentive contract to conduct future spare parts
allowancing. Using a "hybrid type" incentive contract,
allowing spare parts contractors to set spare parts
allowances based on: (1) their own established targets, and
(2) a minimum Government set requirement, just as it is
described in the Besen-Terasawa recruiting model. During
the Interim Supply Support (ISS) phase (Pre-MSD) , the
contractor is providing support to a given limited set of
fielded equipment. During the ISS phase, the repair parts
supply contractor is gathering data on the breakdown of
parts, components and repair cycles. By using the
Government's required MTBF and usage rates as a minimum
setting the contractor can be given the opportunity to
provide his "best estimate" of the yearly supply parts
support requirements. Given the contractor's prediction and
the Government's minimum requirements, an incentive table,
just like the one used in the Besen-Terasawa recruiting
model can be generated. After a set time of performance,
the contractor' s actual support numbers can be compared to
his "prediction, " and incentives can be calculated for
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profit or penalty. An example model is provided in Appendix
F.
C. BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTING INCENTIVE -TYPE CONTRACTS
Development and initiation of this type of incentive
contract requires ingenuity and creativity. However, as a
contracting professional, we must be aware of the fact that
ingenuity and incentive contracts can create some of the
most complex pieces of paper put into motion. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) warns us to "...negotiate them




" Additionally, we must
be careful to ensure we "...include a cost incentive (or
constraint) that operates to preclude rewarding a contractor
for superior technical performance or delivery results when
the cost of those results outweighs their value to the
Government . " 24
Over the years, incentive contracts have received their
fair share of Congressional attention. In July of 1988, the
Office of the Inspector General (IG) reported to the
Secretary of Defense on Incentive contracts. For 1986, the
Department of Defense (DoD) had obligated $21.3 billion on
835 fixed-priced-incentive contracts. The issue being
investigated was the overpayment, and management control of
; FAR part 16. 402-2 (e), December 1997
1 FAR part 16. 402-4 (b), December 1997
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incentive-type contracts. DoD was responsible for nor
collecting approximately $940 million in overpayments and
accrued interest valued at $18.6 million. This is a prime
example of how complex incentive-type contracts combined
with a lax attitude to contract administration can present a
presumption that incentive-type contracts are bad.
Contracting officers must remember a contract is not closed
just because the item or service has been provided. The
administration and closure of a contract is just as
important as assigning a contract.
As noted above, one of the major barriers to assigning
an incentive contract, is the Government's past history with
effectively monitoring, managing and close out of incentive
contracts. The second and largest barrier to assigning an
incentive contract for "parts/logistics support" is Title
10, United States Code 2466. Title 10, United States Code
2466 assigns a percentage limitation of not more than 40
percent of the funds available in a fiscal year, be used to
contract for depot-level maintenance and repair facilities.
(See Appendix G) .
Additional barriers to using incentive contracts for
"parts and logistics support," are: 25
' JACG Flexible Sustainment Guide, Appendix F, 14 August 1997
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• Contract lengths. In the case where the Service
Contracting Act comes into play, contract lengths
are limited to five years.
• Competition. While exceptions do exist supporting
sole source or other than competitive acquisitions,
developing sustained philosophies and contracting
methods that dictate sole source contracting, such
as this proposed long term incentive contracts,
would be counter to current public laws. (i.e.,
awarding the incentive contract to a new contractor,
who has less or higher expectations on the predicted
value of the target/goal. In this case, the
incentive model would have to be recomputed and a
comparison of "best value" to the Government would
have to be reviewed.)
• Social Legislation. Since by necessity, contracting
methods to support the concepts proposed above would
surely dictate sole source contracting to large
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) , the Small
and Small Disadvantaged Business goals set by
Government contracting would be severely impacted.
The last barrier I would like to discuss is the current
corporate hierarchy. Senior leaders today are drawn into
two different groups, those that advocate logistics support,
and those who support force modernization. Today's
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political arena is forcing more and more senior DoD
executives toward the group favoring modernization. A prime
example of this mentality is noted in the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Logistics) speech on 5 November 1996,
concerning "Balancing Readiness, Resources and Risk." Vice
Admiral Hancock is quoted:
We are spending far too much on logistics relative
to our combat forces...especially when you consider
our requirements for force modernization. We must
transform our current logistics system.. First, the
Need...as we said, is to generate funds for force
modernization...within a constrained defense budget.
The Opportunity...is that I believe we can enhance
military capability by shifting significant funds
from support areas to modernization.
As noted, even the senior leader of logistics for the Navy
is suggesting we improve readiness through modernization and
process improvement, and not through improved logistics
support of what we have. However many within DoD and
industry question the wisdom of such an approach, especially
in light of reduced defense budgets and increased weapon
systems life spans.
D. ACCEPTANCE OF THE "HYBRID" CONTRACT BY INDUSTRY
As mentioned above, the use of incentive contracts is
not a new concept. In November of 1987, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) reported to the Honorable Senator
Levin concerning the targets imposed in Fixed-Price-
Incentive-contracts . Although 53.2 percent of the 62
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contracts, valued at $997 million overran target price, the
GAO stated:
...mere achievement of target price is no guarantee
that the [GJovernment paid an appropriate price
under a contract. Target prices are relevant to
the question of over or under payment only if they
have been properly established to reflect a
mutually agreed reasonable price. In theory, this
can be achieved only when both the [GJovernment
and the contractor are equally knowledgeable and
have equal bargaining power in contract
negotiations. Without a complete price and cost
analysis, including all supporting data available
at the time of price negotiations, we know of no
way to determine if target prices are reasonably
set... Despite these limits, the close clustering of
final prices around the targets is an indicator
that Fixed [-] Price [-] Incentive contracts are
working as they were designed to.
Acceptability by the Government is the first step,
however, in order to accomplish the suggested feat,
commercial business must also embrace the use of spare parts
allowancing through the use of incentive-type contracts.
Alan Boyden of Rockwell's Collins Avionics and
Communications Division, in discussing the success of the
use of an incentive contract using Mean-Time-Between-Failure
(MBTF) as its goal, stated the following, 26
The benefits of [the incentive contract] ...do
not end with financial considerations. The pride
and satisfaction of having been involved in a
paradigm-busting acquisition program from the
ground up is apparent in the spirit and
"ownership" espoused by both the [GJovernment and
contractor program participants. The fact that
all program success metrics are being exceeded is
evidence that the use of sound business judgment
Contract Management, AN/ARC-210 Communications Systems Acquisition
Reform - A Success Story, (August 1997), pg. 18.
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is a superb tool for both the [GJovernment and
industry
Added benefits to the contractor, include the ability
for him to schedule production, because he now has a set
amount of assets he must produce throughout the year.
Additionally, with the contractor as the depot repair
site or receiving direct information from an organic depot
site, the contractor also has the capability to identify if
the need for more assets to be manufactured prior to the
actual order time. With the incentive profit, payable after
a set time frame, preferably after a year or more, the
contractor can look forward to the "additional" profit.
Lastly, if negotiated properly, the contractor can enter
into an incentive contract with revisable goals. In this
way, the contractor can continually strive to manufacture
"better" parts in an attempt to attain a higher "predicted"
goals and follow-on incentive profits.
E. CHAPTER REVIEW
This chapter has introduced the concept of the
incentive-type contract and the goals associated with it.
It has also introduced the Besen-Terasawa incentive model, a
model that allows the Government to incentivize based upon
the contractor's predicted goals. This is a major change to
the standard Governmental incentive-type contract in which
the Government sets the goals for the contractor to attain.
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This chapter has also shown that both contractors and
Government personnel are amenable to using incentive
contracts to attain sufficient parts support in an era of
"shrinking" DoD budgets. However, there are major barriers
that must be overcome, from "outsourcing" depot repair to
the acceptance of allowing contractors to predict and assign
spare parts allowances. Lastly, this chapter has shown that
incentive-type contracts are not new and are found to be
"effective" by the Government (GAO)
.
Subsequent chapters will be concerned with the
gathering of data of three weapon systems, and determining
if the use of incentive-type contracts are a viable
alternative to the spare parts allowancing process.
Finally, a cost and readiness comparison will be conducted
to show theoretically, if incentive-type contracts are cost
effective in today's austere budget environment.
4:
V. DATA REPRESENTATION
A. COST AND DATA OF WEAPON SYSTEM A (PAST)
The first of three weapon systems to be examined is
the Night Targeting System (NTS), for the AH-1W, Cobra
helicopter (series "whiskey") . The Interim Supply Support
(ISS) phase for this system commenced in 1993, with an
expected Material Support Date (MSD) of April 1997. ISS
allowances established in 1993 are depicted in Table 5-1.
Old NUN Old Cost New NUN Nomenclature Old Allowance
LL-Z98-M178 $98,000.00 01-430-4088 TSU-MOD 1
LL-Z98-M179 $85,000.00 01-430-9689 PEB 2
LL-Z98-M180 $95,000.00 01-430-3962 PEB 1
LL-Z98-M181 $4,000.00 01-430-3960 SCA MOD 2
LL-Z98-M182 $5,000.00 01-430-9679 LRP 3
LL-Z98-M183 $4,500.00 01-430-9691 LCP 3
LL-Z98-M184 $16,000.00 01-430-3959 ecu 2
LL-Z98-M185 $4,000.00 01-430-3970 LHG 2
LL-Z98-M186 $13,000.00 01-431-6747 CRT MONITOR 1
LL-Z98-M187 $16,000.00 01-431-6742 CCD CAMERA 1
LL-Z98-M188 $35,000.00 01-430-6901 VCR 1
LL-Z98-M189 $140,000.00 TIS (FLIR)
LL-Z98-M190 $200,000.00 RFTDL
Total Cost: $ 503,500
Table 5-1
SNAPSHOT INFORMATION OF THE NIGHT TARGETING SYSTEM
COMPONENTS
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Upon reaching MSD in April 1997, the allowances for the
NTS had been adjusted to support all AH-1W helicopters.
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However, funding was not available to procure 100 percent of
the allowances directed to the fleet. Table 5-2 shows that
because of funding shortfalls and re-appropriation of funds,
this weapon system had a 42.03 percent monetary shortage of
allowances to support the fleet, as of May 1997. 2l














LL-Z98-M178 $98,000 01-430-4088 1 13 $889,830 29.64 113 48
LL-Z98-M179 $85,000 01-430-9689 2 7 $55,520 9.22 67 28
LL-Z98-M180 $95,000 01-430-3962 1 9 $165,900 11.48 63 27
LL-Z98-M181 $4,000 01-430-3960 2 17 $63,810 32.56 136 58
LL-Z98-M182 $5,000 01-430-9679 3 $6,200 0.19 17 6
LL-Z98-M183 $4,500 01-430-9691 3 2 $7,660 0.28 38 11
LL-Z98-M184 $16,000 01-430-3959 2 9 $49,770 0.28 58 25
LL-Z98-M185 $4,000 01-430-3970 2 7 $7,480 48 21
LL-Z98-M186 $13,000 01-431-6747 1 12 $15,660 97 39
LL-Z98-M187 $16,000 01-431-6742 1 6 $22,120 67 27




THE NIGHT TARGETING SYSTEM NEW PRICES AND ALLOWANCES
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
These tables show that it is not always possible to
completely outfit a weapon system, even with proper
instructions in place, (e.g., the NAVSUP Instruction
4000. 36A), and proper steps in funding for a weapon system
(consisting of a mere eleven items) . Funding becomes an
issue
.
Unfunded and PPR allowances gathered through NAVICP snapshot,
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Table 5-3, represents the current parts posture of the
NTS. It should be noted that deficiencies still exist in a
system that has been in use for over two years. Sadly, the
percentage of monetary shortfall of allowanced quantities
has increased to almost 50 percent. In a military logistics
arena where funding is lacking, spare parts support does not
appear to be a high priority.














LL-Z98-M178 $98,000 01-430-4088 1 13 $889,830 19.22 104 52
LL-Z98-M179 $85,000 01-430-9689 2 7 $55,520 2.62 65 34
LL-Z98-M180 $95,000 01-430-3962 1 9 $165,900 6.98 38 14
LL-Z98-M181 $4,000 01-430-3960 2 17 $63,810 12.73 124 66
LL-Z98-M182 $5,000 01-430-9679 3 $6,200 0.94 15 10
LL-Z98-M183 $4,500 01-430-9691 3 2 $7,660 0.23 23 13
LL-Z98-M184 $16,000 01-430-3959 2 9 $49,770 27 13
LL-Z98-M185 $4,000 01-430-3970 2 7 $7,480 1.50 47 23
LL-Z98-M186 $13,000 01-431-6747 1 12 $15,660 1.33 97 45
LL-Z98-M187 $16,000 01-431-6742 1 6 $22,120 1.33 69 33




THE NIGHT TARGETING SYSTEM UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
B. COST AND DATA OF WEAPON SYSTEM B (PRESENT)
The second of three weapon systems to be examined is
the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) for the H-46, Sea
Knight helicopter. The Interim Supply Support (ISS) phase
for this system commenced in 1995, with an expected Material
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Support Date (MSD) of May 1998. ISS allowances established
in October 1995 are depicted in Table 5-4.
NUN Old Cost Nomenclature Old Allowance
01-421-1216 $2,060.00 CCA 2
01-421-1217 $2,250.00 CCA 2
01-421-1218 $1,430.00 CCA 2
01-421-1220 $2,290.00 CCA 2
01-421-1221 $76,190.00 FLT CONTROL GROUP 8
01-421-1223 $1,320.00 CCA 2
Total Cost: $ 628,220
Table 5-4
SNAPSHOT INFORMATION FOR THE AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL
SYSTEM
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Upon reaching MSD in May 1998, the allowances for the
Automatic Flight Control System had been adjusted to support
all H-4 6 helicopters. Again, funding was not available to
procure 100 percent of the allowances directed to the fleet.
Although allowances had been reduced, Table 5-5 shows the H-
46 AFCS has an allowance shortfall of over 75 percent as of
the time of this study (May 1998) . This shortfall is
primarily due to funding constraints and re-appropriation of
funds to higher priority programs. 28
During the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) phase,
Chief of Naval Operation's staff (OPNAV) continually plans
and provides for only 85 percent of the full funding
requirements destined for logistics support. This is done
23 Unfunded and PPR allowances gathered through NAVICP snapshot.
46














01-421-1216 $2,060.00 CCA 1 2 $2,060 1.00 25 7
01-421-1217 $2,250.00 CCA 1 2 $2,250 1.00 16 7
01-421-1218 $1,430.00 CCA 1 2 $1 ,430 1.00 17 7




4 8 $76,190 unknown 86 21
01-421-1223 $1,320.00 CCA 1 2 $1,320 1.00 16 7
Table 5-5
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS NEW PRICES, ALLOWANCES
AND UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
to "incentivize" item managers to seek out cost saving
initiatives while still attempting to support the fleet. In
both of the above weapon systems, the monetary shortfall is
greater than the 15 percent shortfall OPNAV initiated during
MSD.
Again, these tables indicate that, even with proper
instructions and weapon system funding/procedures, support
to the fleet of this six component weapon system logistics
package is not always possible.
C. ESTIMATED COST AND DATA OF WEAPON SYSTEM C (FUTURE)
The last of the three weapon systems to be examined is
the AN/AAQ-14 Precision Strike Forward Looking Infra-Red
(FLIR) System for the F-14, Tomcat Fighter aircraft. The
Interim Supply Support (ISS) phase for this system commenced
in 1997, with an expected Material Support Date (MSD) of May
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1999. ISS allowances are depicted below in Table 5-6.
nun Cost Nomenclature Current Allowance
01-267-7287 $9,543.12 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-268-4611 $59,378.74 SLIP RING
01-268-4984 $5,983.98 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-268-5008 $1,969.55 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-268-5009 $2,539.50 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-268-5010 $2,523.35 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-268-5733 $16,953.70 RELAY ASSEMBLY, OPTIC
01-269-2759 $6,616.17 GYROSCOPE, RATE
01-269-9867 $12,471.18 MOTOR, CONTROL
01-292-6733 $17,213.74 ROLL ASSEMBLY, OPTIC
01-327-1271 $1,598.41 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-327-2548 $2,007.54 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-328-0031 $2,328.89 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-351-0611 $7,438.21 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-356-3791 $5,461.74 AMPLIFIER ASSEMBLY
01-358-5160 $8,661.68 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-362-6761 $12,067.68 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-362-9049 $139,143.51 POWER SUPPLY
01-362-9743 $8,980.05 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-363-0353 $6,626.51 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-363-7072 $92,658.75 AIR CONDITIONER
01-363-9488 $26,784.89 SCANNER, MATCHED SET
01-364-3118 $73,503.53 DETECTOR ASSEMBLY
01-364-9908 $8,319.64 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-365-0167 $3,192.88 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-365-6880 $21 ,972.40 ELECTRONIC UNIT, LASER
01-365-9470 $228,746.12 RECEIVER-TRANSMITTER
01-366-3099 $21,634.06 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-366-3099 $21 ,634.06 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-373-2769 $363,025.29 ROLL SECTION, TARGET
01-379-4943 $3,890.94 AMPLIFIER, ELECTRONIC
01-380-8079 $12,366.99 ACTUATOR, ELCTRON-ME
01-388-2919 $8,993.21 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-388-3022 $12,707.05 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-388-3777 $13,961.00 NOSE SECTION, TARGET
01-388-4059 $13,394.20 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-391-4749 $13,992.95 ACTUATOR, ELECTRO-MEC
01-398-2147 $3,404.15 AMPLIFIER, ELECTRONIC
4S
nun Cost Nomenclature Current Allowance
P'.SO CIRCUIT CARD ASSY
01-422-7337 $14,520.00 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-422-7339 $5,890.00 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-426-5090 $9,960.00 GENERATOR, SYMBOL, HE
01-426-5091 $5,000.00 INERTIAL SYSTEM NAV
01-426-5150 $190,330.00 PANAL, CONTROL, ELECT
01-426-5191 $254,110.00 TARGET SET, RADAR
01-729-8441 $5,000.00 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
Total Cost: $1,750,515.65
Table 5-6
ALLOWANCE LISTING FOR THE PRECISION STRIKE FLIR
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Upon reaching MSD in May 1999, the allowances for the
Precision Strike FLIR are expected to be adjusted in order
to support all F-14 aircraft (approximately 8 Aviation
Consolidated Allowance Lists - AVCALs) . With procurement
funding expected to continue to decline until the year 2000,
one could assume this weapon system will have similar
allowance shortfalls as the AH-1W NTS and the H-46 AFCS.
The past pattern shows a 24 to 50 percent shortage in
funding, which eguates to a monetary shortfall of $3.3M to
$7.0M for this system alone. However, this system is
currently showing "unfunded'' requirements valued at
$28,828,283.77, which equates to a 95 percent shortfall.
The preceding tables of weapon system allowances are
but three in a continual list of approximately 500, and




Interviews with item managers and major Department of
Defense contracting company personnel revealed that funding
shortages are not expected to end anytime in the near
future. Personnel interviewed would not comment when spare
parts (logistics) support funding shortages are expected to
end. However, barring any emergent funding from Congress
and OPNAV to make up for the "unofficial" $800 million
logistics deficiency that already exists, one can be certain
from the budget predictions that it will not be until after
the year 2000.
With funding being the number one issue of providing
repair parts support to the fleet, a majority of interviewed
item managers agree that the United States Navy must look to
alternatives to allowancing and outfitting the fleet.
E. CHAPTER REVIEW
This chapter has assembled data for three weapon
systems that are in different stages of the outfitting
process
:
(1) The "past" system is the Night Targeting System,
which has gone through the ISS phase, MSD, and has
been in use by the fleet for the past year. It is a
system which should be fully supported for, however
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is only supported at 45 percent of its allowance
requirement
.
(2) The "current" system is the Automatic Flight
Control System, which has gone through the ISS
phase, MSD and is new to the fleet. It is a system
which is starting its fleet support in a 20 percent
monetary/allowance deficient status.
(3) The "future" system is the Precision Strike FLIR,
which is currently in its ISS phase, and is not due
to reach MSD until May 1999. It too, is also a
system "doomed" to reach MSD in an expected
monetary/allowance deficient status.
Although previous chapters have introduced and
discussed the methodical and step-by-step procedures set out
to properly outfit the fleet, the data in this chapter
indicate the end results are not even near the desired
outcome. In each instance, the weapon system has entered
the fleet with insufficient spare parts to support the
fielded system.
The next chapter will take a theoretical look at each
of these weapon systems and examine the possible advantages
of using an incentive contract model for assigning spare
parts allowances. Additionally, the study will review how
"creating" a more precise AVCAL can lead to the possibility
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VI. ANALYSIS - MODEL COMPARISONS
A. WEAPON SYSTEM A (PAST)
The "Past" Weapon System examined in the previous
chapter was the Night Targeting System (NTS) for the AH-1W,
Cobra helicopter. The Allowance listing at Material Support


















01-430-4088 $98,000 1 13 $889,830 29.64 113 48
01-430-9689 $85,000 2 7 $55,520 9.22 67 28
01-430-3962 $95,000 1 9 $165,900 11.48 63 27
01-430-3960 $4,000 2 17 $63,810 32.56 136 58
01-430-9679 $5,000 3 $6,200 0.19 17 6
01-430-9691 $4,500 3 2 $7,660 0.28 38 11
01-430-3959 $16,000 2 9 $49,770 0.28 58 25
01-430-3970 $4,000 2 7 $7,480 48 21
01-431-6747 $13,000 1 12 $15,660 97 39
01-431-6742 $16,000 1 6 $22,120 67 27





THE ALLOWANCE LISTING FOR THE NIGHT TARGETING SYSTEM AT
MATERIAL SUPPORT DATE
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
1. RBS MODEL VERSUS INCENTIVE -TYPE CONTRACT MODEL
We will assume an incentive contract is agreed
upon by both the contractor and the Government one year
prior to Material Support Date (MSD) . An additional
assumption is that the "negotiated" target price is 10
53
percent above pre-MSD prices. The 10 percent increase
assumes an estimated increase due to inflation and other
unrelated factors. This figure can be "negotiated" up or
down depending on current economic conditions. Lastly, an
assumed profit (target profit) and maximum incentive profit
is 7.5 percent of the total price for all of the Planned
Program Requirements (PPR) (target price) , and a ceiling
price will be 120 percent of the target cost. For
simplicity, the incentive profit will be weighted for each
part based upon price. If the incentive profit is not
properly crafted, the contractor can "game" the system by
incurring small penalties for high cost parts that do not
meet minimum requirements, and by taking large incentives by
producing low cost parts which greatly exceed the minimum
requirements. However, this hybrid incentive contract
prevents this from occurring by using the price of the
component as a weighted percentage factor of the total
incentive or penalty.





3 Negotiated Target Cost is 110 percent of the sum of the products of
Pre-MSD Prices and their respective Planned Program Requirement
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Share Ratio: 70/30.
For this illustration, the contractor's predicted demand is
set 15 percent above the quarterly demand specified in Table

































-$209,903 -$293,864 -$377,825 -$461,786 -$545,747 -$629,708 -$713,669 -$797,630 -$881,591 -$965,552 -$1,049,513
Govt
Min-5%
-$125,942 -$209,903 -$293,864 -$377,825 -$461 ,786 -$545,747 -$629,708 -$713,669 -$797,630 -$881 ,591 -$965,552
Govt
Min-2%
-$41 ,981 -$125,942 -$209,903 -$293,864 -$377,825 -$461 ,786 -$545,747 -$629,708 -$713,669 -$797,630 -$881,591
Govt Min $0 $0 $0 $o $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Govt
Min+5%
$0 $735,407 $693,426 $609,469 $525,504 $441,543 $357,582 $273,621 $189,660 $105,699 $21,738
Govt
Min+10%
$0 $784,319 $826,300 $784,319 $700,358 $616,397 $532,436 $448,475 $364,514 $280,553 $196,592
GOVt
Min+15%
CO $886,445 $928,427 $886,446 $802,485 $718,524 $634,563 $550,602 $466,641 $382,680
Govt
Min+20%
$0 $833,274 $917,235 $1,001,196 $1,043,176 $1,001,196 $917,235 $833,274 $749,313 $665,352 $581,391
Govt Min
+25%
$0 $878,245 $962,206 $1,046,167 $1,130,128 $1,172,108 $1,130,128 $1,046,167 $962,206 $878,245 $794,284
Govt
Min+30%
$0 $939,151 $1,023,112 $1,107,073 $1,191,034 $1 ,274,995 $1,316,975 $1 ,274,995 $1,191,034 <t> a a r\—j j-v-?o^l,IU/.U/J G*a rvNO a a ->
Govt
Min+35%
$0 $1,017,962 $1,101,923 $1,185,884 $1 ,269,845 $1 ,353,806 $1 ,437,767 $1 ,479,748 $1 ,437,767 $1 ,353,806 $1,269,845
Govt Min
+40%
$0 $1,116,891 $1 ,200,852 $1 ,284,813 $1 ,368,774 $1,452,735 $1 ,536,696 $1 ,620,657 $1,662,638 $1 ,620,657 $1,536,696
Govt
Min+45%
$0 $1 ,238,425 $1 ,322,386 $1,406,347 $1,490,308 $1 ,574,269 $1,658,230 $1,742,191 $1,826,152 $1,868,132 $1,826,152
Govt
Min+50%
$0 $1 ,385,357 $1,469,318 $1,553,279 $1 ,637,240 $1,721,201 $1,805,162 $1,889,123 $1,973,084 $2,057,045 $2,099,025
Table 6-2 INCENTIVE TABLE FOR "PAST'' SYSTEM
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
After one year of operation in the fleet, the actual
quarterly demands are presented in Table 6-3.
Suppose for this unit, the Final Negotiated Price is:
$27, 500,000.
Profit:

























01-430-4088 34.87 29.64 19.22 45% $1,406,347 0.26 $367,036
01-430-9689 10.85 9.22 2.62 76% $1,553,279 0.23 $351,608
01-430-3962 13.51 11.48 6.98 48% $1,553,279 0.25 $392,973
01-430-3960 3831 32.56 12.73 67% $1,553,279 $16,546
01-430-9679 0.22 0.19 0.94 -321 % ($461 ,786) 0.01 -$6,149
01-430-9691 0.33 0.28 0.23 30% $1,107,073 0.01 $13,267
01-430-3959 0.33 0.28 165% $1,553,279 0.04 $66,185
01-430-3970 0.01 1.5 -14900% ($461,786) 0.01 -$4,919
01-431-6747 0.01 1.33 -13200% ($461,786) 0.03 -$15,987
01-431-6742 0.01 1.33 -13200% ($461 ,786) 0.04 -$19,677
01-430-6901 14.64 12.42 6.32 57% $1,553,279 0.09 $144,780
$1,305,663
Table 6-3
ACTUAL QUARTERLY DEMANDS FOR THE NIGHT TARGETING
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
SYSTEM
Incentive/Penalty (from Table 6-3): $1,305,663.
Price to Government:
$27,500,000 + $2,245,125 + $1,305,663 = $31,050,788.
Contractor's Profit Rate:
$3,550,788 / 27,500,000 = 12.91%
In this example, both the Government and the contractor
would have worked together to improve the limited number of
high failure components to the fleet. This "teaming" would
have incentivized the contractor to attain the "extra"
incentive profit.
In the case of the NTS, the actual new prices
negotiated by the contractor were 3.5 times greater than the
pre-MSD prices. The total funding required to fill all
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post-MSD assigned allowances was $131,115,850. Funding at
the Chief of Naval Operation's staff (OPNAV) 85 percent
level would have equated to $111,448,475. In comparing the
above incentive figures with the OPNAV funding, a cost
savings of $80,397,687 is evident for this illustrative
example
.
B. WEAPON SYSTEM B (PRESENT)
The "Present'' Weapon System examined in the previous
chapter was the Automatic Flight Control System for the H-4 6
Sea Knight helicopter. The allowance listing for the


















01-421-1216 $2,060.00 1 2 $2,060 1.00 25 7
01-421-1217 $2,250.00 1 2 $2,250 1.00 16 7
01-421-1218 $1,430.00 1 2 $1,430 1.00 17 7
01-421-1220 $2,290.00 1 2 $2,290 1.50 17 7
01-421-1221 $76,190.00 4 8 $76,190 unknown 86 21
01-421-1223 $1,320.00 1 2 $1,320 1.00 16 7
Table 6-4
ALLOWANCE LISTINGS FOR THE AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL
SYSTEM.
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
1. RBS MODEL VERSUS INCENTIVE -TYPE CONTRACT MODEL
Again we will assume an incentive contract is agreed
upon by both the contractor and the Government one year
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prior to Material Support Date (MSD) . An additional
assumption is that the "negotiated" target cost is 10
percent above pre-MSD prices. This percentage is used to
assume an expected increase in economy, and other negotiated
factors. Lastly, an assumed profit (target profit) and
maximum incentive profit is 7.5 percent of the total price
for all of the PPR requirements (target price) , and a
ceiling price will be 120 percent of the target cost. Again
for simplicity, the incentive profit will be weighted for
each part based upon price. If the incentive profit is not
properly crafted, the contractor can "game" the system by
incurring small penalties for high cost parts that do not
meet minimum requirements, and by taking large incentives by
producing low cost parts which greatly exceed the minimum
requirements. However, this hybrid incentive contract
prevents this from occurring by using the price of the
component as a weighted percentage factor of the total
incentive or penalty.





30 Negotiated Target Cost is 110 percent cf the sum of rhe products of
Pre-MSD Prices and their respective Planned Program Requirement
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Share Ratio: 70/30.
For this illustration, the contractor' s predicted demand is
set 15 percent above the quarterly demand specified in Table































-$55,475 -$77,655 -$99,854 -$122,044 -$144,234 -$166,424 -$188,614 -$210,804 -$232,994 -$255,183 -$277,373
Govt Min-
5%
-$33,285 -$55,475 -$77,665 -$99,854 -$122,044 -$144,234 -$166,424 -$188,614 -$210,804 -$232,994 -$255,183
Govt Min-
2%
-$1 1 ,095 -$33,285 -$55,475 -$77,665 -$99,854 -$122,044 -$144,234 -$166,424 -$188,614 -$210,804 -$232,994
Govt Min $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Govt
Min+5%
$0 $194,359 $183,264 $161,074 $138,884 $116,694 $94,505 $72,315 $50,125 $27,935 $5,745
Govt
Min+10%
$0 $207,286 $218,381 $207,286 $185,096 $162,906 $140,716 $118527 $96,337 $74,147 $51,957
Govt
Min+15%
$0 $212,087 $234,277 $245,372 $234,277 $212,087 $189,897 $167,707 $145,517 $123,328 $101,138
Govt
Min+20%
$0 $220,224 $242,414 $264,604 $275,699 $264,604 $242,414 $220,224 $198,034 $1 75,844 $153,654
Govt Min
+25%
$0 $232,109 $254,299 $276,489 $298,679 $309,774 $298,679 $276,489 $254,299 $232,109 $209,919
Govt
Min+30%
$0 $248,206 $270,396 $292,586 $314,776 $336,965 $348,060 $336,965 $314,776 $292,586 $270,396
Govt
Min+35%
$0 $269,035 $291,225 $313,415 $335,604 $357,794 $379,984 $391,079 $379,984 $357,794 $335,604
Govt Min
+40%
$0 $295,181 $317,370 $339,560 $361,750 $383,940 $406,130 $428,320 $439,415 $428,320 $406,130
Govt
Min+45%
$0 $327,300 $349,490 $371,680 $393,870 $416,060 $438,250 $460,440 $482,629 $493,724 $482,629
Govt
Min+50%
$0 $366,133 $388,323 $410,512 $432,702 $454,892 $477,082 $499,272 $521,462 $543,652 $554,747
Table 6-5 INCENTIVE TABLE FOR "PFJESENT" SYSTEM
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
For this weapon system, we will review two hypothetical
situations that can occur after one year. First, the system
works as designed and the Mean-Time-Between-Failures





























$2,060 01-421-1216 1.18 1 1 0.02 15.00 $245,372 S5.909
$2,250 01-421-1217 1.18 1 1 0.03 15.00 S245.372 $6,454
$1,430 01-421-1218 1.18 1 1 0.02 15% $245,372 $4,102
$2,290 01-421-1220 1.76 1.5 1.5 0.03 15% $245,372 $6,569
$76,190 01-421-1221 1.18 1 1 0.89 15% $245,372 $218,551
$1,320 01-421-1223 1.18 1 1 0.02 15% $245,372 $3,786
$245,372
Table 6-6
INCENTIVE PROFIT BASED UPON THE CONTRACTOR MEETING PREDICTED
VALUES
.
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Suppose for this situation, the Final Negotiated Price is:
$7,500, 000.
Profit:
$554,746 + [$7,396,620 - 7,500,000] * 0.3 = $585,760.
Incentive/Penalty (from Table 6-6): $245,372.
Price to Government:
$7,500,000 + $585,760 + $245,372 = $8,331,132.
Contractor's Profit Rate:
$831,132 / $7,500,000 = 11.08%
Under the second scenario, we will assume the
contractor had problems with the low costing components and
was only able to meet Government minimum requirements.
However, for the one high cost component, the contractor was
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01-421-1216 1.18 1 1.18 0% $0 0.02 $0
01-421-1217 1.18 1 1.18 0% $0 0.03 $0
01-421-1218 1.18 1 1.18 0% SO 0.02 $0
01-421-1220 1.76 1.5 1.76 0% $0 0.03 $0
01-421-1221 1.18 1 0.88 25% $276,489 0.89 $246,267
01-421-1223 1.18 1 1.18 0% $0 0.02 $0
$246,267
Table 6-7
INCENTIVE PROFIT BASED UPON THE CONTRACTOR EXCEEDING ONLY
ONE PREDICTION
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Suppose for this scenario the Final Negotiated Price is:
$7, 500, 000.
Profit:
$554,746 + [$7,396,620 - 7,500,000] * 0.3 = $585,760.
Incentive/Penalty (from Table 6-7): $246,267.
Price to Government:
$7,500,000 + $585,760 + $246,267 = $8,332,027.
Contractor's Profit Rate:
$832,027 / $7,500,000 = 11.09%
In the second scenario, the contractor met Government
minimum requirements, which assumes parts were available
when the fleet required them. Additionally, one must assume
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the contractor had to put in extra hours, time and money to
attain such a low MTBF rate on the most expensive component
in the weapon system. The profit increase of one-one
hundredth of a percent, shows that the contractor cannot
"play" the system, by only attaining a low MTBF on one
component, while letting all the others fall below his
predicted value or below the minimum Government
requirements
.
In the case of the automatic flight control system, the
actual new prices negotiated by the contractor were the
same, and the allowances were reduced by a factor of 2. The
total funding required to fill all post-MSD assigned
allowances was $6, 724, 200
.
31 Funding at the OPNAV 85
percent level would have equated to $5,715,570. In
comparing the above incentive figures with the OPNAV
funding, a hypothetical cost of an additional $2,616,457
would have to be incurred. However, this price includes the
100 percent availability of parts to assigned allowances.
As opposed to the shortages of parts assigned to the
assigned allowances for the fleet. The total "unfunded"
parts requirement in the fleet for this weapon system is
currently $1, 665, 440
,
32 Although not within the scope of
' This value is the sum of the products of the Post-MSD price and its
respective Planned Program Requirement.
: This value is the sum of the products of the Post-MSD price and its
respective Unfunded Requirement.
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this thesis, one could ask "What is the price of readiness
in this situation?"
C. WEAPON SYSTEM C (FUTURE)
The "Future" Weapon System examined in the previous
chapter was the Precision Strike Forward Looking Infra-Red
(FLIR) system for the F-14, Tomcat Fighter aircraft. The
allowance listing for the Automatic Flight Control System is
provided in Table 6-8.
nun Pre-MSD Price Nomenclature Current Allowance
01-267-7287 $9,543.12 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-268-4611 $59,378 74 SLIP RING
01-268-4984 $5,983.98 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-268-5008 $1,969.55 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-268-5009 $2,539.50 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-268-5010 $2,523.35 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-268-5733 $16,953.70 RELAY ASSEMBLY, OPTIC
01-269-2759 $6,616.17 GYROSCOPE, RATE
01-269-9867 $12,471.18 MOTOR, CONTROL
01-292-6733 $17,213.74 ROLL ASSEMBLY, OPTIC
01-327-1271 $1 ,598.41 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-327-2548 $2,007.54 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-328-0031 $2,328.89 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-351-0611 $7,438.21 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-356-3791 $5,461.74 AMPLIFIER ASSEMBLY
01-358-5160 $8,661.68 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-362-6761 $12,067.68 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-362-9049 $139,143.51 POWER SUPPLY
01-362-9743 $8,980.05 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-36^0353 $6,626.51 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-363-7072 $92,658.75 AIR CONDITIONER
01-363-9488 $26,784.89 SCANNER, MATCHED SET
01-364-3118 $73,503.53 DETECTOR ASSEMBLY
01-364-9908 $8,319.64 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-365-0167 $3,192.88 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
01-365-6880 $21 ,972.40 ELECTRONIC UNIT, LASER
01-365-9470 $228,746.12 RECEIVER-TRANSMITTER
01-366-3099 $21,634.06 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-373-2769 $363,025.29 ROLL SECTION, TARGET
01-379-4943 $3,890.94 AMPLIFIER, ELECTRONIC
01-380-8079 $12,366.99 ACTUATOR, ELCTRON-ME
01-388-2919 $8,993.21 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-388-3022 $12,707.05 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-388-3777 $13,961.00 NOSE SECTION, TARGET
01-388-4059 $13,394.20 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01 -391 -4749 $13,992.95 ACTUATOR, ELECTRO-MEC
01-398-2147 $3,404.15 AMPLIFIER, ELECTRONIC
01-415-7720 $13,650.35 PISO CIRCUIT CARD ASSY
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NUN Pre-MSD Price Nomenclature Current Allowance
01 -422-7337 $14,520.00 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-422-7339 $5.890 00 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
01-426-5090 $9,960.00 GENERATOR. SYMBOL, HE
01-426-5091 $5,000 00 INERTIAL SYSTEM NAV
01-426-5150 $190,330.00 PANAL, CONTROL, ELECT
01-426-5191 $254,110.00 TARGET SET, RADAR
01-729-8441 $5,000.00 ELECTRONIC COMPONENT
Total Cost $1,750,515.65
TABLE 6-8 ALLOWANCES FOR THE PRECISION STRIKE FLIR
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
1. RBS MODEL VERSUS INCENTIVE -TYPE CONTRACT MODEL
In this final weapon system we will again assume an
incentive contract is agreed upon by both the contractor and
the Government one year prior to Material Support Date
(MSD) . As in the previous two weapon systems reviewed, we
will assume that the "negotiated" target cost is 10 percent
above pre-MSD prices. Again, the 10 percent increase in
price is to account for inflation and unrelated negotiated
changes. An assumed profit (target profit) and maximum
incentive profit is 7.5 percent of the total price for all
of the PPR requirements (target price) , and a ceiling price
will be 120 percent of the target cost. Again for
simplicity, the incentive profit will be weighted for each
part based upon price. This prevents the contractor from
taking a small penalty by allowing high cost parts to fail
at a high rate, while taking multiple "awards" by keeping
low costing parts within or above the predicted values.
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For this illustration, the contractor's predicted
demand/mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) is assumed to be set
15 percent above the allowance specified in Table 6-8 (As































-$250,565 -$350,791 -$451 ,01
7
-$551 ,243 -$651,468 -$751 ,694 -$851 ,920 -$952,146 -$1 ,052,372 -$1,152,598 -$1 ,252,824
Govt Min-
5%
-$150,339 -$250,565 -$350,791 -$451 ,01
7
-$551 ,243 -$651,468 -$751 ,694 -$851,920 -$952,146 -$1 ,052,372 -$1,152,598
Govt Min-
2%
-$50,113 -$150,339 -$250,565 -$350,791 -$451 ,01
7
-$551,243 -$651 ,468 -$751 .694 -$851,920 -$952,146 -$1,052,372
Govt Min $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Govt
Min+5%
$0 $877,870 $827,757 $727,531 $627,305 $527,079 $426,853 $326,627 $226,401 $126,175 $25,950
Govt
Min+10%
$0 $936,258 $986,371 $936,258 $836,032 $735,806 $635,580 $535,354 $435,128 $334,902 $234,676
Govt
Min+15%
$0 $957,943 $1,058,169 $1,108,282 $1,058,169 $957,943 $857,717 $757,491 $657,265 $557,039 $456,813
Govt
Min+20%
$0 $994,695 $1 ,094,921 $1,195,147 $1 ,245,260 $1,195,147 $1 ,094,921 $994,695 $894,469 $794,244 $694,018
Govt Min
+25%
$0 $1 ,048,378 $1,148,604 $1 ,248,830 $1,349,056 $1,399,169 $1 ,349,056 $1 ,248,830 $1,148,604 $1 ,048,378 $948,152
Govt
Min+30%
$0 $1,121,083 $1,221,309 $1,321,535 $1,421,761 $1,521,987 $1,572,100 $1 ,521 ,987 $1,421,761 $1 ,321 ,535 $1,221,309
Govt
Min+35%
$0 $1,215,162 $1,315,388 $1,415,613 $1,515,839 $1,616,065 $1,716,291 $1 ,766,404 $1,716,291 $1,616,065 $1,515,839
Govt Min
+40%
$0 $1,333,255 $1,433,481 $1,533,707 $1,633,933 $1,734,159 $1 ,834,385 $1,934,611 $1,964,724 $1,934,611 $1,834,385
Govt
Min+45%
$0 $1 ,478,332 $1 ,578,558 $1 ,678,784 $1,779,010 $1 ,879,236 $1 ,979,462 $2,079,688 $2,179,914 $2,230,027 $2,179,914
Govt
Min+50%
$0 $1 ,653,728 $1 ,753,954 $1,854,180 $1 ,954,405 $2,054,631 $2,154,857 $2,255,083 $2,355,309 $2,455,535 $2,505,648
Table 6-9
INCENTVE PROFIT TABLE FOR THE PRECISION STRIKE FLIR
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Negotiated Target Cost is 110 percent of the sum of the products of
Pre-MSD Prices and their respective Planned Program Requirement.
65
Since all outcomes for this weapon system are
hypothetical, we will look at a good, bad and indifferent
scenario outcome to determine the impact on fleet readiness
and contractor profit.
For the first scenario, we will assume that the
contractor is having difficulty maintaining its predicted
MTBFs. We will assume the contractor is able to maintain
Government minimum requirements for the high cost items
(cost greater than $20,000), but fell short of the
Government minimum standards for the low cost items (cost





















01-267-7287 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.55% -$3,005
01-268-4611 1.18 1.17 0% 3.39% $0
01-268-4984 1 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.34% -$1 ,884
01-268-5008 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 11% -$620
01-268-5009 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 15% -$800
01-268-5010 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.14% -$795
01-268-5733 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.97% -$5,339
01 -269-2759 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.38% -$2,083
01 -269-9867 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 71% -$3,927
01 -292-6733 1.18 1 29 -10% -551243 0.98% -$5,421
01-327-1271 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.09% -$503
01 -327-2548 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.11% -$632
01-328-0031 1 18 1.29 -10% -551243 013% -$733
01-351-0611 1 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.42% -$2,342
01-356-3791 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.31% -$1,720
01-358-5160 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.49% -$2,728
01 -362-6761 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.69% -$3,800
01-362-9049 1.18 1 17 0% 7.95% $0
01 -362-9743 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.51% -$2,828
01-3630353 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.38% -$2,087
01 -353-7072 1.18 1.17 0% 5.29% $0
01-353-9488 1.18 1 17 0% 1.53% $0
01-364-3118 1.18 1.17 0% 4.20% $0
01-354-9908 1.18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.48% -$2,620
01-365-0167 1 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.18% -$1,005
01-365-6880 1 18 1 17 0% 1.26% $0
01-365-9470 1 18 1.17 0% 13.07% $0
01-366-3099 1 18 1.17 0% 1 .24% $0






















01-379-4943 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.22% -$1,225
01-380-8079 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.71% -$3,894
01-388-2919 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.51 % -$2,832
01-388-3022 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.73% -$4,001
01-388-3777 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.80% -$4,396
01-388-4059 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.77% -$4,218
01-391-4749 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.80% -$4,406
01-398-2147 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.19% -$1 ,072
01-415-7720 18 1.29 -10% -551243 78% -$4,299
01-422-7337 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.83% -$4,572
01-422-7339 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.34% -$1,855
01-426-5090 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.57% -$3,136
01-426-5091 18 1.29 -10% -551243 0.29% -$1 ,575
01^26-5150 18 1.17 0% 10.87% $0
01-426-5191 18 1.17 0% 14.52% $0






T BASED UPON MEETING MINIMUM GOVERNMENT
PARTS COSTING MORE THAN $20,000 AND NOT
REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTS COSTING LESS THAN
$20, 000
ource: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Suppose for this scenario, the Final Negotiated Price is:
$35,000, 000
Profit:
$2,505,648 + [$33,408,636 - 35,000,000] * 0.3 - $2,028,239.
Incentive/Penalty (from Table 6-10): -$87,930.
Price to Government:
$35,000,000 + $2,028,239 - $87,930 = $36,940,309.
Contractor's Profit Rate:
$1,940,309 / $35,000,000 = 5.54%
Under the second condition, we will assume the
contractor had problems with the low costing components and
was only able to meet Government minimum requirements.
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Additionally, for high costing components the contractor
fell short of the Government minimum requirements by 2
percent. However, for the highest costing component, the
contractor was able to exceed the Government minimum




















01-267-7287 18 1.18 0.00 $0 0.55% $0
01 -268-461
1
18 1.20 -2% -$350,791 3.39% -$11,899
01 -268-4984 18 1 18 000 $0 34% $0
01-268-5008 18 1.18 0.00 $0 0.11% $0
01-268-5009 18 1.18 0.00 $0 0.15% $0
01-268-5010 18 1.18 0.00 $0 14% SO
01-268-5733 18 1.18 0.00 $0 0.97% $0
01-269-2759 18 1 18 0.00 $0 0.38% $0
01-269-9867 18 1.18 0.00 $0 0.71% $0
01
-292-6733 18 1.18 0.00 $0 0.98% $0
01-327-1271 18 1.18 0.00 $0 0.09% $0
01 -327-2548 18 1.18 0.00 $0 0.11% $0
01-328-0031 18 1.18 0% $0 0.13% $0
01-351-0611 18 1.18 0% $0 0.42% $0
01 -356-3791 18 1.18 0% $0 0.31% $0
01-358-5160 18 1.18 0% $0 0.49% $0
01-362-6761 18 1.18 0% $0 0.69% $0
01-362-9049 18 1.20 -2% -$350,791 7.95% -$27,883
01-362-9743 18 1.18 0% $0 0.51% $0
01-363-0353 18 1.18 0% $0 0.38% $0
01-363-7072 18 1.20 -2% -$350,791 5.29% -$18,568
01-363-9488 18 1.20 -2% -$350,791 1.53% -$5,368
01-364-3118 18 1.20 -2% -$350,791 4.20% -$14,730
01-364-9908 18 1.18 0% $0 0.48% $0
01-36S0167 18 1.18 0% $0 0.18% $0
01-365-6880 18 1.20 -2% -$350,791 1 .26% -$4,403
01-365-9470 18 1.20 -2% -$350,791 13.07% -$45,839
01-366-3099 18 1 20 -2% -$350,791 1 .24% -$4,335
01-373-2769 18 088 25% $1 ,248,830 20.74% $258,985
01-379-4943 18 1.18 0% SO 0.22% $0
01-380-8079 18 1 18 0% $0 0.71% $0
01-388-2919 18 1.18 0% $0 0.51% $0
01-388-3022 18 1 18 0% $0 0.73% $0
01-388^3777 18 1.18 0% $0 0.80% $0
01-388-4059 18 1 18 0% $0 077% $0
01-391-4749 18 1 18 0% $0 0.80% $0
01-398-2147 18 1 18 0% $0 0.19% $0
01-415-7720 18 1.18 0% $0 0.78% $0
01^122-7337 18 1.18 0% $0 0.83% $0
01 -422-7339 18 1.18 0% $0 0.34% $0
01 -426-5090 18 1.18 0% $0 0.57% $0
01 -426-5091 18 1.18 0% $0 0.29% $0
01-426-5150 18 1.20 -2% -$350,791 10.87% -$38,141





Minimum Predicted Actual or below Govt.
MTBF Quarterly Quarterly requirement Incentive from Weight of Total Incentive
New NUN Demand Demand Table Incentive
01-729-8441 1.18 1 1.18 0% $0 0.29% $0
100.00% $36,897
Table 6-11
INCENTIVE PROFIT BASED UPON MEETING MINIMUM GOVERNMENT
REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTS COSTING LESS THAN $20,000 AND NOT
MEETING MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTS COSTING MORE THAN
$20, 000
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Suppose for this scenario the Final Negotiated Price is:
$35,000, 000
Profit:
$2,505,648 + [$33,408,636 - 35,000,000] * 0.3 = $2,028,239.
Incentive/Penalty (from Table 6-11): $36,897.
Price to Government:
$35,000,000 + $2,028,239 + $36,897 = $37,065,136.
Contractor's Profit Rate:
$2,065,136 / $35,000,000 = 5.9%
Under the last scenario, we will assume the contractor
has some problems with the high costing components, but was
able to maintain his predicted allowances (MTBFs)
.
Additionally, for the low cost components, the contractor
























01-267-7287 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 055% $6,808
01-268-4611 1 18 1 00 15% $1,195,147 3.39% $40,540
01-268-4984 1 18 094 20% $1 .248,830 0.34% $4,269
01-268-5008 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.11% $1,405
01 -268-5009 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.15% $1,812
01-268-5010 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.14% $1,800
01-268-5733 1 18 0.94 20% $1,248,830 0.97% $12,095
01-269-2759 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.38% $4,720
01-269-9867 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 71% $8,897
01-292-6733 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248.830 0.98% $12,280
01-327-1271 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.09% $1,140
01-327-2548 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.11% $1,432
01-328-0031 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248.830 013% $1,661
OK351-0611 1 18 0.94 20% $1 ,248.830 0.42% $5,306
01-356-3791 1 18 0.94 20% $1 .248,830 0.31% $3,896
01-358-5160 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.49% $6,179
01-352-6761 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 069% $8,609
01-362-9049 1.18 1.00 15% $1,195,147 7.95% $94,999
01-362-9743 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.51% $6,406
01-363-0353 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.38% $4,727
01^63-7072 1.18 1.00 15% $1,195,147 5.29% $63,262
01-363-9488 1.18 1.00 15% $1,195,147 1.53% $18,287
01-364-3118 1.18 1.00 15% $1,195,147 4 20% $50,184
01^64-9908 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.48% $5,935
01-365-0167 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 018% $2,278
01-365-6880 1.18 1.00 15% $1,195,147 1.26% $15,001
01-355-9470 1.18 1.00 15% $1,195,147 13.07% $156,174
01-366-3099 1.18 1.00 15% $1,195,147 1 .24% $14,770
01-373-2769 1.18 1.00 15% $1,195,147 20.74% $247,852
01-379-4943 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.22% $2,776
01-380-8079 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.71% $8,823
01-388-2919 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.51% $6,416
01-388-3022 1.18 094 20% $1 248,830 0.73% $9,065
01-388-3777 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.80% $9,960
01-388-4059 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.77% $9,556
01-391-4749 1.18 0.94 20% $1 .248,830 080% $9,983
01-398-2147 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.19% $2,429
01-415-7720 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.78% $9,738
01-422-7337 1.18 0.94 20% $1,248,830 0.83% $10,359
01-422-7339 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.34% $4,202
01-426-5090 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.57% $7,106
01-426-5091 1.18 0.94 20% $1 ,248,830 0.29% $3,567
01-426-5150 1.18 1.00 15% $1,195,147 10.87% $129,946
01-426-5191 1.18 1.00 15% $1,195,147 14.52% $1 73,491






T BASED UPON MEETING THE CONTRACTOR PREDICTED
S FOR PARTS COSTING MORE THAN $20,000 AND
CONTRACTOR PREDICTED REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTS
COSTING LESS THAN $20,000
Source: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
7o
Suppose for this scenario the Final Negotiated Price is:
$35, 000, 000
Profit:
$2,505,648 + [$33,408,636 - 35,000,000] * 0.3 = $2,028,239.
Incentive/Penalty (from Table 6-12): $1,203,710.
Price to Government:
$35,000,000 + $2,028,239 + $1,203,710 - $38,231,949.
Contractor's Profit Rate:
$3,231,949 / $35,000,000 = 9.23%
In the worst case scenario, the contractor and the item
manager can work together to maintain parts support at the
Government's minimum requirements. Additionally, this
pricing arrangement penalizes the contractor for not
"standing behind his work, " and provides an incentive to
improve contractor performance. In the past, the
Government's only recourse to this problem was to purchase
more spare parts, which in turn provided more profit to the
contractor. Past situations in logistics spare parts
support did not allow for a "carrot" or "stick" to encourage
the contractor to "better" his process, nor "stand behind
his work/word."
In the best case scenario, the fleet is provided with
the "best" support possible. Additionally, the contractor
strives to keep MTBF high or quarterly demand low to achieve
the highest profit possible.
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In each of the preceding scenarios, the incentive
contract ceiling cost is $40,000,000. In comparing this
cost with the OPNAV 85 percent budget of $25,815,763.81,
this incentive could be assumed to be too expensive.
However, one must also take note that this weapon system is
considerably under funded at only $1,750,515.65. The
researcher believes that the price of $40,000,000 may be
reasonable to support the fleet. The question this study
presents to today's leadership is; "What price are you
willing to pay today to ensure readiness tomorrow?"
D. CHAPTER REVIEW
This chapter has taken the sample incentive-type
contract and applied it to three distinctly different weapon
systems. Application of this type contract/pricing
arrangement has shown mixed results. Use of an incentive-
type contract has the potential to produce cost savings, but
it does not guarantee all contract requirements will be met.
However, in every instance, it has shown that an incentive
is provided for the contractor to meet his predicted values.
If the contractor can meet or attain his predicted values,
the contractor will earn more profit. Conversely, if the
contractor is unable to attain his predicted values, the
contractor receives less than anticipated profit, no profit,
or perhaps a negative profit (loss) .
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Lastly, as represented in each of the preceding
scenarios, the contractor will continually strive to predict
the most accurate value for the "best" profit. This in turn
provides the Government with a means of precisely
calculating appropriate spare parts allowances, and accurate
total prices required for budgeting out year requirements.
In providing budget personnel with accurate pricing
information, the Department of Defense (DoD) will be able to




VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This study has presented an overview of the U.S. Navy's
complex logistics support, development and acquisition
process. Within this system, it is often necessary to
anticipate and fund requirements up to six years prior to
the formal start of development or procurement. Unlike
everyday business accounting processes, the military must
also manage and use different ''colors'' of money (Research
and Development, Procurement, Operations and Maintenance
appropriations) to develop, procure and support various
weapon systems.
Additionally, this study has provided a brief overview of
current funding constraints and attendant impacts on
logistics support and readiness. Finally, this study
introduced and recommended the use of a "hybrid" incentive-
type contract to accurately determine supply parts
allowances. The proposed hybrid contract incorporates
concepts from incentive-type contracts currently in use
today and theoretical concepts from the Besen-Teraswa
incentive study. This hybrid contract allows the contractor
to "predict" the military's supply support requirements.
The incentive feature of this proposed contract motivates
the contractor to provide "better" products and penalizes
75
contractors for delivering "inferior" products. This study
has also shown that today's military item managers and






The United States Navy is continually investigating
ways to create logistical supply support allowances which
both support the fleet and create cost savings. In a time
of austere funding, the United States Navy has reviewed its
spare parts allowancing process. It has continually looked
for "better" ways to calculate allowances and fulfill two
requirements. With dwindling procurement accounts, the
first requirement is one of cost savings to outfitting
appropriations. However, in providing cost savings, the
second requirement is to ensure proper logistical support is
provided to the fleet. This study has demonstrated how the
U.S. Navy has advanced from the Demand Based System (DBS) to





The United States Navy has not demonstrated confidence
to "outsource" logistical supply support (Aviation
76
Consolidated Allowance Lists - AVCAL)
.
Over the years the
United States Navy has continued to outsource areas of
operations in an attempt to gain cost savings. However, in
the area of logistics supply support (spare parts
allowancing) the Government is reluctant to trust the
contractor. As identified in this study through interviews,
item managers still indicate a need for oversight and
"control" of logistical parts support. Many personnel
interviewed expressed a cautious tone toward outsourcing
spare parts allowancing. These same interviewees indicate
it will take a great deal of trust to outsource spare parts
allowancing
.
3 . Conclusion #3
Under current and historical spare parts policies and
procedures, there is little the Government can do to
penalize a contractor for providing "bad" work, or to
incentivize him to do "better" work . Under normal incentive
contracting, the contractor is incentivized to do better and
penalized if he does poorly. However, the goals and
penalties of the standard incentive contract are based upon
Governmental standards. There currently is no set contract
which incentivizes the contractor to "tell the truth" in his
capabilities, nor for the contractor to provide better
logistics support.
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4 . Conclusion #4
Insufficient funding has adversely affected logistical
support and fleet readiness . The very reason this study was
conducted was because of a lack of parts. The lack of parts
is a direct result of insufficient funding. In each of the
scenarios presented in this study, funding was a key issue.
Year after year there are shortfalls in the Department of
Defense budget. Because logistics support does not provide
instantaneous results (i.e. the part may sit on the shelf
for some time), it is considered expendable. At some point
in the future, the Department of Defense must determine when




A pilot study should be conducted by Commander, Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) , in conjunction with Commander,
Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) and Commander, Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to determine the feasibility of
using the hybrid incentive contract presented in this study
as a means of predicting proper, accurate allowances for the
fleet . This would place credence on the Navy's budgetary
requirements and dismiss Mr. Zumwalt's (N88CB) main reason
comptrollers and budgeters have difficulty in funding
7S
logistics supply spare parts due to its current inaccuracy
in predicting its allowances.
2 . Recommendation #2
The United States Navy should invest in a study or
survey by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) to identify
two requirements: cost savings and potential partnerships in
the use of "hybrid" contracting . Under the first
requirement, CNA should attempt to identify if there is a
cost savings associated with outsourcing spare parts
allowancing to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or
other defense industrial base entities. Under the second
requirement, CNA should identify the interest and desire of
defense industrial base companies to "sponsor" a weapon
system, or to work hand-in-hand with DoD in using the hybrid




Current Federal Regulations do not prohibit the use of
an incentive contract as described in this study. It is
recommended that an incentive-type contract, such as the one
mentioned in this study be initiated . The contract type can
be incorporated with a supply source, such as with a Prime
Vendor contractor. Outcomes of the study should be printed
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and distributed to acquisition personnel, to contend or
defend the use of the "hybrid" incentive-type contract.
4 . Recommendation #4
It is highly recommended that Commander, Naval Supply
Systems Command (NAVSUP) review current shortfalls and
trends, in an attempt to identify the root cause of growing
deficiencies. These trends should then be scrutinized to
identify a point in time when logistical support shortfalls
bring war fighting resources below Chief of Naval
Operation's (CNQ's) readiness goals . Only in the past five
years, has the Naval War College conducted war games in
which logistics support was a determining variable. As
discussed in this study, logistics funding has been used to
support operational requirements. Only when senior leaders
have been shown when and where our forces will be non-
operational will appropriate funding for infrastructure and
logistical support be provided.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This section will discuss the primary and subsidiary
research questions posed for this study in Chapter 1.
Although this study did not conclude that incentive
contracting for spare parts allowances provides "better"
support at a lesser cost than Readiness Based Sparing (RBS)
,
NO
it indicates that incentive-type contracts have the
potential to improve allowance forecasting and spare parts
budget defense processes. Sufficient funding for any
program does not always guarantee the best support.
However, this study has shown that innovative contracts,
such as the hybrid incentive contract, coupled with
sufficient funding, can lead to more accurate predictions in
logistics spare parts allowancing. Accurate allowance
forecasts provide decision makers with the information they
need to make informed decisions during the PBBS resource
allocation process. Additionally, better accuracy leads to
increased credibility and confidence in our true logistic
support needs. In turn, higher confidence in our
allowancing forecasts makes it easier to support and defend
spare parts budgets.
1 . Primary Research Question
Can the U.S. Navy achieve a realistic AVCAL sufficient
to support the fleet, by using a combination of contractor
suggested allowances and incentive-type contracts? This
study has provided possible advantages and disadvantages to
using a hybrid incentive contract. It has also provided the
major barriers that are limiting the "outsourcing" of depot
repair and spare parts allowancing. Lastly this study has
shown that theoretically, it is possible to achieve an
accurate and realistic allowance listing to support today'
s
fleet, through the use of a combination of contractor




a. Subsidiary Question #1
How does the U.S. Navy currently calculate initial
outfitting allowances ? This study has shown how the United
States Navy initially computed spare parts allowances
through the use of a Demand Based System (DBS) . When
funding constraints became rampant, the Navy resorted to a
Readiness Based System (RBS) of allowancing. Through the
use of RBS, the Navy claims to have saved in excess of $30
million for each Aviation Consolidated Allowance List
(AVCAL) , while maintaining Chief of Naval Operation's
(CNO's) mission capability goals.
^
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b. Subsidiary Question #2
How does the U.S. Navy currently fund initial
outfitting allowances? As this study has shown, the funding
process is a long, cumbersome process which starts with
identifying a military requirement and eventually ends with
spare parts in the fleet. Only at the end of the major
weapon systems procurement, (fielding phase), does logistics
1 CNA Briefing CAB 94-75 of January 1995
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funding become available. However, logistics funding is
only provided by the Chief of Naval Operations staff (OPNAV)
at 85 percent of the full funding requirements. Over the
years, the military has found an alternative use for money
originally earmarked for logistics support. As discussed in
this study, much of the logistics funding ultimately has
been used to support operational needs and requirements.
Despite the formal logistic funding process outlined in
PBBS, the military has not funded spare parts support
requirements to appropriate levels.
c. Subsidiary Question #3
What is Material Support Date (MSP) and why is it
so important? Material Support Date (MSD) is the date in
which the Government takes "control" of supporting a weapon
system with spare parts support. Up until MSD, the
logistical spare parts support is provided by a contractor,
usually the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) . The
"color" of money used to pay the contractor, prior to MSD is
different than the "color" of money used after MSD.
The key to supporting any procurement in the
military is prior planning. By planning the MSD,
programmers and budget personnel are able to correctly
identify the amounts and "colors" of money to be used in
each year. If MSD is adjusted either forward or backward,
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the amount and different type (color) of funding is no
longer correctly budgeted. Eventually, one will have too
much of one "color" and not enough of another "color" of
money. This is why MSD is such an important factor in the
budgeting of funds for logistics spare parts support.
d. Subsidiary Question #4
How does the incentive-type contract work? This
study defined an incentive contract and provided the
definitions from the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
.
The incentive contract is used to motivate the contractor to
meet a Government objective, such as a shorter Mean-Time-To-
Repair (MTTR) or a longer Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF)
The contractor has the potential to earn greater profit if
they meet or exceed the Government's specified goal.
g. Subsidiary Question #5
How will the use of an incentive-type Contract
differ from how the U.S. Navy currently does business? The
use of an incentive-type contract will not differ from the
way the U.S. Navy currently does business. However, by
using a "hybrid" incentive-type contract where goals are set
by the contractor, the U.S. Navy has the potential to obtain
superior performance and logistics support. By using the
"hybrid" incentive-type contract for allowances, the U.S.
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Navy will be able to work with contractors to accurately
predict minimum allowances required to support the fleet.
In accurately predicting allowances, budget personnel will
in turn be provided with accurate pricing requirements
needed for logistical support appropriations.
f . Subsidiary Question #6
What are the negative effects of using an
incentive-type Contract for initial outfitting? The major
negative effect of using an incentive-type contract for
initial outfitting is the perceived loss of Government item
manager and item manager analyst jobs.
As discussed in this study (chapter IV) , there
is a potential for the loss of Small Business Administration
quotas not being filled, and a large potential of initiating
sole source contracts to many large OEMs. A final negative
impact, presented by this study, will be the possible
repealment of the "60/40" rule (Title 10, United States Code
24 66) , which limits the amount of depot maintenance funding
that can be spent outside the military. Once repealed, the
possibility of outsourcing any and all positions and jobs
within the military become possible.
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g. Subsidiary Question #7
What will be the estimated cost or savings from
using an incentive-type contract? In the three weapon
systems presented in this study, savings are estimated at
$80,397,687, and costs associated with the "hybrid"
incentive contract range from $2,616,457 to $14,274,599.
The calculated costs and savings above are the difference
between the calculated cost of using the hybrid incentive
contract and that of the OPNAV 8 5 percent funding.
Estimated savings would be greater and costs ' would be
smaller if compared to the cost of fully funding each weapon
system presented. However, the reader should take note that
all values are hypothetical, primarily due to the fact that
each of the weapon systems presented in this study are still
not fully funded.
h. Subsidiary Question #8
Does an incentive-type contract provide a "fair and
equitable" contract, beneficial to both the Government and
commercial suppliers? In interviews with U.S. Navy item
managers and major defense contractors, the incentive
contract provides a "fair and equitable" agreement for both
the Government and the contractor. If the situation was not
beneficial to both parties, one or the other party would not
agree to the type of contract.
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In the case of the "hybrid" contract, both military
and defense contractors agree that letting the contractor
"predict" his supportability, above the Government minimum
requirements, is beneficial to all. Above all, the "hybrid"
incentive contract provides the best benefits to the
warrior, with the potential of improved spare parts support.
E. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
Other areas requiring further research are:
• If one were to look back five years and determine the
U.S. Navy's logistics procurement appropriation
shortfall, could one determine a correlation to today's
fleet readiness?
• What other vehicles are available for predicting and
producing spare parts allowances?
• How deficient is the logistics procurement account? If
some of these funds were reprogrammed, what accounts
received those funds? What is the net present value of
the deferred costs of logistics supply support? Can we
determine the cost of deferring prior year funds to the
cost of procuring the same parts today?
• Can we use this hybrid incentive-type contract in other




APPENDIX A. SAMPLE FIXED PROTECTION (RIMAIR) CALCULATION35
1. Background. Below is an example of how to calculate a
Fixed Protection (RIMAIR) quantity.
2. The Candidate. For the purposes of this example, the





NUN Price MRF RPF TAT Flying Hours Period
NUN 1 $75K .082 .105 3.0 Days 270/aircraft 90
*Note: Future flying hours and endurance period are
obtained from 013 via a confidential planning document which
also provides the approved safety (protection) level
threshold, number of aircraft and OST (if authorized) . OST
is not authorized in RIMAIR calculations at this time.
' Provided verbatim from Enclosure (1) of Appendix 1 from NAVICP Memo
Q343:AP of 22 Nov 1994
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3. Calculation
STEP 1 . Calculate the Expended Maintenance Cycles
Expanded Maintenance Cycles =
90 Days Future Flying Hrs per Aircraft X Number of Aircraft.
100 (Constant value which refers to # of flying hours in 1
maintenance cycle)
Using the information from Table 1 and assuming 013 Planning
has specified one aircraft, the formula is applied as
follows
:
Expanded Maintenance Cycles =
270 [Future Flying Hours] X 10 [Number of Aircraft] = 27
100
Step 2. Calculate the Average Resupply Pipeline
Average Resupply Pipeline =
90
MRF X Occurrences X 90 Days Expanded Maintenance Cycles X
(Endurance Period + OST (expressed in days) ) (if authorized)
90 (Constant. Represents number of days in a quarter)
where
:
(1) MRF = Maintenance Replacement Factor (DEN F001)
(2) Occurrences = Total units per end item
(e.g. aircraft)
(3) Expanded Maintenance Cycles = 27
(4) Endurance period = 90 (days) for deployed sites, 60
(days) for selected OCONUS shore sites and 30 (days)
for CONUS shore sites (as specified in the 013
planning document in the NOTE in paragraph 2)
.
Because the outfitting being computed in this
example is for a deployed site, the endurance period
is 90 days.
(5) OST (Order and Ship Time) is currently zero (days)
for RIMAIR (or as specified in the 013 planning
document. See the Note in paragraph 2.)
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Using information from Table 1, the formula is
applied as follows:
NUN 1: (0.82 X 1 X 27 X 90) / 90 = 2.214
Step 3. Calculate the Average Repair Pipeline:
Average Repair Pipeline =
RPF X Occurrences X 90 Days Expended Maint. Cycles X TAT
90 (Constant. Represents number of days in a quarter)
where
:
(1) RPF - Rotable Pool Factor (DEN F001A)
(2) TAT = I-Level Turn Around Time (DEN F010E)
Using information from Table 1, the formula is applied as
follows
:
NUN 1: (0.105 X 1 X 27 X 3) / 90 = 0.095
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STEP 4. Calculate Average Total Pipeline:
Average Total Pipeline =
Average Resupply Pipeline + Average Repair Pipeline
Using the results of steps 2 and 3, our example item yield
the following :
NUN 1: 2.214 + 0.095 = 2.309
Step 5. Determine Authorized Outfitting Quantity- Apply
Average Total Pipeline to 85% Poisson protection level
table.
Using the results of steps 1-4, our example item
yields the following:
NUN 1 Average Total Pipeline = 2.309, Authorized
Outfitting = 4
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APPENDIX B. MISSION CAPABLE (MC) AND FULL MISSION CAPABLE
(FMC) GOALS BY TYPE /MODEL/SERIES (T/M/S) AIRCRAFT AND UNIT
OPERATIONAL CATEGORY FOR CURRENT FISCAL YEAR36
1. Overall goals combine operational status category codes
defined in OPNAVIST 5442. 2F.
2. Operational category "A" aircraft goals are five percent
higher than the overall goals.
3. Operational category "B" aircraft goals are the same as
the overall goals.
4. Operational category "C", "D", and "E" aircraft goals are
five percent lower than the overall goals.
OVERALL









Verbatim listing of OPNAVINST 5440. 2M CH-1 of 1 July 1992
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APPENDIX D. SAMPLE RBS CALCULATION38
1. Background. The following example is provided to
illustrate the calculations performed by the ARROW'S
model in computing outfittings using Readiness Based
Sparing (RBS) . The example is necessarily oversimplified
due to the large number of calculations required for even
a handful of items. While it is not practical to show
every computation for this example, the general logic
followed by the ARROW'S model will be useful in
understanding RBS stockage decisions.
2. The Candidates. This example will consider an outfitting
for a carrier that deploys one aircraft which operates
one unit system X, comprised of 3 WRAs, NUN 1, NUN 2,
NUN 3. These items are the same as those used in the
Sample Fixed Protection (RIMAIR) calculation in Appendix
A. The reliability, maintainability and cost of the
items is shown below:
38
Provided verbatim from Enclosure (4) of Appendix i from NAVICP Memo 0343 :A?






NUN Price MRF RPF TAT OST Time Hours
NIIN1 $100K .102 .557 4.0 Days 25 Days 3 Hrs 3400
NIIN2 $138K .229 .112 8.8 Days 25 Days 3 Hrs 3400
NIIN3 $129K .384 .103 5.4 Days 25 Days 3 Hrs 3400
Note: Future flying hours and endurance period are obtained
from 013 via a confidential planning document which also
provides the appropriate safety (protection) level
threshold, number of aircraft and authorized OST for RIMAIR.
3. Calculation.
Step 1. Calculate the Expanded Maintenance Cycles
Expanded Maintenance Cycles =
90 Days Future Flying Hrs per Aircraft X Number of Aircraft
100 (Constant value which refers to # flying hrs in 1
maintenance cycle)
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(Note: Future flying hours are obtained via a confidential
planning memo from 013 which stipulates the endurance period
and advises whether or not safety level and OST (for RIMAIR
calculations) is authorized)
Using the information from Table 1, the formula is applied
as follows:
Expanded Maintenance Cycles = 3400 / 100 = 34
Step 2. Calculate the Average Resupply Pipeline
Average Resupply Pipeline =
MRF X Occurrences X Expanded Maintenance Cycles X
(Endurance Period + OST (Expressed as days)
90 (Constant. Represents number of days in a quarter)
where
1) MRF = Maintenance Replacement Factor (DEN F001
107
(2) Occurrences = Total units per end item (e.g.
aircraft)
(3) Expanded Maintenance Cycles = 34
(4) Endurance period = Zero (days) for RBS
(5) OST (Order and Ship Time) is currently 25 (days)
for RBS.




NUN 1: (0.102 X 1 X 34 X 25) / 90 = 0.963
NUN 2: (0.229 X 1 X 34 X 25) / 90 = 2.163
NUN 3: (0.384 X 1 X 34 X 25) / 90 = 3.627
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Step 3. Calculate the Average Repair Pipeline:
Average Repair Pipeline =
RPF X Occurrences X Expanded Maintenance Cycles X TAT
90 (Constant. Represents the number of days in a quarter)
where
:
(1) RPF = Rotable Pool Factor (DEN F001A)
(2) TAT = I-Level Turn Around Time (DEN F010E)







(0.557 X 1 X 34 X 4.0) / 90 = 0.842
(0.112 X 1 X 34 X 8.8) / 90 = 0.372
(0.103 X 1 X 34 X 5.4) / 90 = 0.210
109
STEP 4. Calculate Average Total Pipeline:
Average Total Pipeline =
Average Resupply Pipeline + Average Repair Pipeline




NUN Repair Pipeline Resupply Pipeline Total Pipeline
NUN 1 0.842 0.963 . 1.805
NUN 2 0.372 2.163 2.535
NUN 3 0.210 3.627 3.837
STEP 5. Compute Expected Backorders . The total Pipeline
from Table 2 is used as the mean in a Poisson Distribution
to compute the average number of backorders that would occur
(expected Backorders (EBO) ) for each level of stock. The
range of stock levels for which these calculations are
performed is affected by parameters that determine the
110
minimum and maximum quantity allowed for each item. In
order to better illustrate how RBS makes its computations,
this example starts with a minimum of and a maximum equal
to the quantity that yields 99.9% protection against having
a backorder at a point in time. In execution, current ASO
policy is to ensure a minimum of 50% an a maximum of 99.0%
protection. When the stock level is zero, the expected
backorders equals the Average Total Pipeline. Expected
backorders for a level of stock is equal to the expected
backorders for stocking one less item than the level being
evaluated minus the risk of a backorder. This can be
expressed as:
EBO(X) = EBO (X-l) - BACKORDER RISK (X-l)
where: X is the stock level being evaluated
The results for this example are shown in Table 5:
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Table 5
Expected Backorders and Protection Levels
NUN 1 NUN 2 NUN 3
Stk EBO Protection Stk EBO Protection Stk EBO Protection
1.805 16.4% 2 .535 7.9% 3 .837 2.2%
1 .969 46.1% 1 1 .614 2 8.0% 1 2 .585 10.4%
2 .431 72.9% 2 .895 J J » J"6 2 1 .963 26.3%
3 .160 8 9.0% 3 .429 75.0% 3 1 .226 46.6%
4 .051 96.3% 4 .179 88.6% 4 .692 66.1%
5 .014 98.9% 5 .066 95.6% 5 .352 81.0%
6 .003 99.7% 6 .021 98.5% 6 .162 90.6%
7 .001 99.9% 7 .006 99.5% 7 .068 95.8%
8 .002 99.8% 8 .026 98.3%









STEP 6. Compute Average Total wO" Level Removal to
Replacement Times. The "0" level maintenance time from
Table 1 indicates it takes 3 hours to remove and replace
each WRA given a ready- for-issue (RFI) unit is in stock. In
execution, removal to replacement times (RRTs) or Mean Time
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to Repair (MTTRs) are set to the aircraft average for every
item. This average is ascertained by SPCC 04 6 based upon 3M
observations. The average "O" level RRT must include the
average time it takes to obtain a RFI unit from supply, as
well as the "O" level maintenance time. This average supply
delay time per removal is zero if a RFI unit is in stock.
If an RFI unit is not in stock, the average supply delay
time represents the time until the next RFI unit will emerge
from either the repair or resupply pipeline. The
probability of having a RFI unit in stock increases as
authorized depth increases. The supply delay therefore
decreases as the stock level increases. The supply delay
time is computed be dividing the expected backorders from
Table 3 by the removal rate per hour. Removal rate per hour
is obtained using the following formula:
Removal Rate =
( (MRF + RPF) X Expanded Maintenance Cycles) / 2160
where: 2160 is the number of hours in a quarter.
The results of the supply delay time calculations for the




NUN 1 NUN 2 NUN 3
oc k Supply Delay Stock Supp!Ly Delay Stock Supply Delay
Ci 174 hours 472 hours 500 hours
: 94 hours 1 300 hours 1 373 hours
2 42 hours 2 167 hours 2 256 hours
2 15 hours 3 80 hours 3 160 hours
4 5 hours 4 33 hours 4 90 hours
5 1 hour 5 12 hours 5 45 hours
6 < 1 hour 6 4 hours 6 21 hours
7 < 1 hour 7 1 hour 7 9 hours
8 < 1 hour 8 3 hours









NOTE: adding the "0" level maintenance time (3 hours) to
the supply delay time represents the total removal to
replacement time for the "0" level.
STEP 7. Compute Item Operational Availability (Ao) . The
are several ways to compute operational availability for
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System X. Current NAVSUP policy is to assume that each item
operates independently of al others. The operational
availability of each item is computed for each stock level
using the removal rate and the "0" level removal to
replacement time which is derived from Table 4. The results
are shown below.
TABLE 5
Item Operational Availability (A )
NUN 1 NUN 2 NUN 3
Stoc k (A ) Stock (Ao) Stock (Ao)
35.3% 2 8.2% 2 0.6%
1 50.0% 1 38.0% 1 25.8%
2 68.4% 2 52.3% 2 j j . o^
3 84.0% 3 69.2% 3 44.5%
4 92.4% 4 83.7% 4 58.3%
5 95.7% 5 92.4% 5 7 3.1%
6 96.7% 6 96.4% 6 84.4%
7 96.9% 7 97.8% 7 91.6%








STEP 8. Compute Cost Effectiveness. The cost effectiveness
of each stock level for each item is determined based on the
cost of reducing supply delay time (hereafter referred to as
SDT) . The cost effectiveness ratio (CE Ratio) is computed
using the following equation:
CE Ration = Price / Decrease in SDT X Item Removal Rate
where: Item Removal Rate =
(MRF+RPF) X Expanded Maintenance Cycles / 2160
For NUN 1 the Price is $100,000, the SDT (for stock = 0) is
174, the SDT (for stock =1) is 94, and the item removal
rate = (0.102 + 0.557) X 34 / 2160:
CE Ratio (NUN 1, Stock = 1) =
$100,000 / [(174-94) X 0.010373148] = 120.5
TABLE 6
Cost to Reduce Supply Delay
NUN 1 NUN 2 NUN 3
Stock CE Ratio Stock CE Ratio Stock CE Ratio
1 120 1 150 1 132
16
2 186 2 192
3 369 3 297
4 913 4 552
5 2720 5 1215
6 9514 6 3108













STEP 9. Rank Items and compute FMC Rates. The RBS
selection list is created based on the cost of effectiveness
ratio of the item stock levels shown in Table 6. The
initial FMC rate before electing any item for stockage is
computed by multiplying together the item A s shown in Table
5 for a stock level of zero on each item. For System X,
this yields an initial FMC rate of 2.0%. This percentage
represents the percentage of time System X will be
operational even though no spares were selected. The




CE Ratio Item Sto
120 NUN 1 1
132 NUN 3 1
144 NUN 3 2
150 NUN 2 1
175 NUN 3 3
186 NUN 1 2
192 NUN 2 2
242 NUN 3 4
297 NUN 2 3
369 NUN 1 3
380 NUN 3 5
552 NUN 2 4
679 NUN 3 6
913 NUN 1 4
1215 NUN 2 5
1367 NUN 3 7
2720 NUN I 5
3071 NUN 3 8
3108 NUN 2 6
Cumulative
Cumulative Total Cost








































7634 NUN 3 9
9082 NUN 2 7
9514 NUN 1 6
20877 NUN 3 10
29940 NUN 2 8
38314 NUN 1 7
62112 NUN 3 11

















STEP 10. Select Stockage Decisions. The stockage decisions
are selected from TABLE 7 based on either a cost or FMC
goal. If the FMC goal for System X is 90.0%, we see form
table 7 that we can achieve 90.7% FMC with 5 units of NUN




APPENDIX E. THE BONUS INCENTIVE MODEL39
In developing this model, we sought to identify
overriding objectives that managers would desire given an
ideal incentive structure. Gonik (1978) in his study of an
effective incentive system for salesmen identified the
following objectives:
1. Reward salesmen for his production.
2. Reward salesmen equitably for his effort.
3. Obtain current and reliable field information on market
potential to make efficient resource decisions.
Goals of the Bonus Incentive Model
The bonus incentive model is an alternative to the
current quota system that incorporates the above objectives.
Highlights of the incentive model are as follows:
1. Provides an incentive for recruiters to surpass quotas
and thereby maximizes true market potential.
2. Rewards recruiters with monetary bonuses based on their
work effort and their ability to forecast.
3. Rewards recruiters equitably despite inherent regional
market differences in the long run.
4. Provides, in the long run, [United States Army Recruiting
Command] USAREC headquarters with valuable market
39
Provided verbatim from the article Quota Based Recruiting System and Bonus Incentive Recruiting
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information that allows for efficient future resource
reallocation to the productive regions.
5. Based on improved forecasting information, the bonus
model indirectly reduces staff workload and minimizes the
variance in the mission process.
6. Model is adjustable to reflect changing Army accession
requirements
.
7. Model is capable of maintaining quality marks.
The key to this incentive structure is to link the
recruiters market forecast to his actual production. Under
this system, the recruiter is rewarded not only for his
production but for his accuracy of his forecast. The higher
and more accurate the forecast, the higher the recruiter'
s
reward will be. This reward incentive encourages recruiters
to maximize their market potential which in turn provides
USAREC with the accurate market information needed to
reallocate resources to more productive regions.
Table 5 shows a possible scenario of recruiter bonus
payments. The recruiter (or recruiting station) must
forecast his performance over a specified period (monthly or
quarterly) . After the actual results are tabulated at the
end of the period the recruiter goes to the bonus table and
aligns his actual production with his forecast to determine
his bonus for that period. Notice that for a given forecast
Model
. by Katsuaki L. Terasawa and Keebom Kang. dated 12 October. 1996
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the bonus is larger for a greater production. Also notice
that for a given production, the bonus is larger when the
forecast becomes more accurate. For example, given a
predicted value of 12, the bonus payment increases as
production increases. A recruiter gains additional payment
as they overproduce. On the other hand, at a given
production of 12, if the recruiter has predicted 12, the
bonus payment would be 188, while under- or over-prediction
would result in lower bonus payment. In order to maximize
his bonus the recruiter must forecast exactly what he truly
believes. The key for success is for the recruiter to be
unbiased in his reporting, which will also benefit
management. Thus, we call the mechanism truth revealing
since the recruiter has the incentive to reveal his true
market potential. Over time a recruiter's forecast will
come to reflect the unbiased estimate of applicants
available in the market.
Under the bonus incentive program both the recruiters
and management will benefit. From the recruiter's
perspective, he receives two important benefits:
1. A bonus tied to production and work effort.
2. A more equitable compensation for their effort (in the
long run) through redeployment of recruiters.




1. Realize true market potential.
2. Provide better information concerning market potential
for a given region to facilitate efficient resource
allocation.
3. Over time, close the gap between forecasts and actual
results. Therefore a recruiter's forecast will come to
reflect the true mean or expected value of the market





















100 98 92 82 68 50 28
140 142 140 134 124 110 92
130 186 188 186 180 170 156
220 230 236 238 236 230 220
260 274 284 290 292 290 284
300 318 332 342 348 350 348
340 362 380 394 404 410 412
Table 5.
Therefore, even though total forecast accuracy may never be
realized, the main objective of [Bonus Incentive Recruiting
Model] BIRM will have been met; enhanced production volume,
more equitable reward structure, and improved field
information.
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Accounting for Regional Market Differences
One of management's objectives is to compensate
recruiters equitably based on their work effort. We have
all heard the stories of recruiters in one region with lines
of applicants waiting in his office, while a recruiter in a
different region has to struggle to meet his mission. Under
the proposed system both recruiters are compensated equally.
Currently, recruiters perceive the quota system as unfair
since they believe some recruiters must work harder than
others to achieve their quotas. However, any efforts to
reduce the inequity by simply adjusting the bonus level
could be inefficient. Instead, we suggest that the
management should consider reallocation of resources. It
could relocate recruiters to the richer markets from the
poorer ones by using the now-available market potential
information. The efficient reallocation of resources would
ensure when each (marginal) dollar of resources spent would
buy the same number of quality recruits. In this way, the
bonus incentive could enhance both the level of equity and
its efficiency in the long run.
Adjusting to Changes in Manpower Requirements
As with most aspects of Department of Defense, the
manpower procurement system is dynamic. Changes in recruit
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requirements are frequent. Since the bonus incentive
schedule reflects the marginal cost of acquiring the desired
level of recruit requirements, the schedule could be
adjusted accordingly. For example, if actual production is
ahead of requirements, the bonus schedule can be adjusted to
lower recruiter incentives, thereby reducing the flow of
applicants. By the same token, payment schedules may be
increased to enhance recruiter effort to increase the number
of applicants/ Using the bonus model in conjunction with
historical production data, management could better estimate
the cost associated with increased production levels.
Sustaining Recruit Quality Marks"
Not all recruiting quality categories require the same
work effort to obtain. For example, high school graduates
are more difficult to recruit than non-high school
graduates. Therefore, due to the differences, more than one
bonus incentive schedule may be published based on quality
levels. In general, the bonus schedule should reflect both
the supply and demand factors of a particular recruit
category.
However, there still remains a question of how frequently such
adjustments should be made to lessen the effect of gaming. The issue
will be addressed in our future research work.
The bonus incentive schedule can reflect factors other than quality
marks that influence the scarcity value of recruit category. For
example, they may include the end-strength number as well as the
military occupational specialty requirement.
126
Conclusion
The current quota structure implies potential
inefficiencies in its resource allocation. Moreover, the
usefulness of current data analysis, which does not filter
out the quota incentive problems, may be limited. The
proposed bonus incentive program seeks a way to maximize
market potential and provide management with better
information to allow for efficient reallocation of personnel
and budget. Currently the variant of this Bonus Incentive
Recruiting Model is being experimented in a small-scale
within the USAREC. Further study and research is required
for large-scale implementation and to develop regional
market and recruiter work effort variables.
Appendix 2 .
Development of Bonus Incentive Recruiting Model (BIRM)
(i) Properties of BIRM:
The development of the Bonus Incentive Recruiting Model
(BIRM) is based on the Osband-Reichelstein model (see Besen
and Terasawa, 1989; Reichelstein, 1990) . Similar to the
Osband-Reichelstein model, BIRM ensures truth revelation
based on the recruiter's forecast, F, and his actual
Ml
production, P. In fact, such truth-revealing bonus payment,
B, must have the following properties:
B=a (F)+b(F) * (P-F)
1. The first component of the bonus or the base bonus,
a(F), depends on the recruiter's forecast, F. The
higher the forecast, the greater the base bonus, a(F),
i.e., the first derivative of a must be positive,
a'=da/dF>0. Moreover, the level of the increase in base
bonus, should be greater with an increase of F, i.e.,
the second derivative of a must be positive,
a"=d2a/dF2>0.
2. The second component of the bonus or the incentive pay,
b(F)*(P-F), depends on the difference between the
forecast and the actual production. If the production
exceeds the recruiter's forecast, P-F, he gets an
additional reward of b(F) per unit of excess production.
If
, on the other hand, the production falls short of
the forecast, P<F, he is penalized by b(F) per unit of
shortfall. We will call b(F) as an incentive parameter.
When his production matches his forecast, then his bonus
depends entirely on the base bonus, a(F)
.
3. The incentive parameter, b(F), is set equal to the
marginal change of the base bonus with respect to F,
i.e., the incentive parameter must equal the first
derivative of the base bonus, b(F)=a'.
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For example, suppose we have a(F)=2F"-100 as the base bonus
for the range of F between ten and seventeen. Then the
incentive parameter, b, is given by, b (F) =da/dF=4F. a and b
both satisfy the sign conditions described above: a, b, a'
and a" are all positive for the relevant range of F
10<F<17 The bonus function becomes
B=2E~-100+4F* (P-f) (A-3.1)
It is easy to see that for a given level of expected
production, E(P)=u, the expected bonus is maximized when the
recruiter's forecast is unbiased, i.e., F=u. From Eguation
(A-3.1), we have the expected bonus, E(B), as:
E (B)=2F2-100+4F* (u-F) (A-3.2)
After differentiating the above expression with respect to F
and setting it equal to zero, we have: dE (B) /dF=0=4* (u-F)
,
which implies F=u. Since the second derivative is negative,
d"E (B) /dF'£=-4<0, the expected bonus is maximized when F={i,
or when the recruiter's forecast is his unbiased estimate.
Table A-l illustrates the base bonus, a, and the incentive
parameter, b, as a function of forecast. The bonus payment
is shown in Table 5 in the text as a function of both
forecast and production.
FORECAST
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
a(F) 100 142 188 238 292 350 412
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b(F) 40 44 48 52 56 64
Table A-l. Base Bonus, a(F), and Incentive Parameter, b(F)
as a function of Forecast.
(ii) Utility Maximization Foundation:
In order to examine the interplay of recruiter's work-
effort and the bonus system, we construct a simple utility
analysis framework. We begin with the recruiter's utility
function, U(Y), which is a concave function of his net
income equivalent, Y. His utility increases with Y but at a
diminishing rate. His net income depends on both the bonus,
B, and the monetary equivalent of his work effort, cW. C
converts work effort, W, into monetary measure. For
illustration, we assume an additive utility function of the
form U=U (Y) =Y S= (B-cW) s where s denotes the level of a
recruiter's risk aversion, 0<s<l . Since B = a (F) +b (F) * (P-
F) , the expected utility is given by,
V=E[U]=a(F)+b(F) * (n-F)-cW (A-3.3)
The expected production, |i, depends on both the recruiter'
s
work effort, W, as well as other market environment, p. . We
assume that it is given by the following simple Cobb-Douglas
production function
H=|i(|i ,W)=Li W k- (A- 3. 4)
The market environment, \i , must be positive since it
represents how accession-rich an area is. An increase in \i
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represents an increase in accession opportunity for the
given market. The parameter k must be between zero and one.
The k ensures a condition of diminishing returns in the work
effort and accessions is impossible, since at some point, no
matter how hard the recruiter works, he cannot produce more
accessions
.
Therefore, the recruiter's expected utility becomes:
V=E[U]=a (F)+b(F) * (n W k-F) -cW (A-3.5)
Next, we want to maximize the recruiter's expected utility,
V, with respect to his forecast and work effort. Since we
want the mechanism to be truth revealing \x must equal F,
which means we must have:
u W k - F = as a side condition.
The first partial derivatives of V with respect to F and W
are
:
dV/dF = a' + b'*(u W k - F) - b' =
simplified:
a' = b (A-3.6)
dV/dW = b * (ku W k_1 ) - c =
Simplified:
W = (bkjio/c) 1/(k_1) (A-3.7)
The second derivatives with respect to F:




Since we have a'=b and a"=b' from equation (A-3.6):
a" >0 (A-3.8
The second derivatives with respect to W:
d2V/dW 2 = b * (k-1) (k^i Wk~2 ) < (A-3.9'
Simplified:
a' * k(k-l)|i/W2 <
The second derivatives with respect to (F, W)
:
d2V/dF dW = b' + (kjio W k_1 ) = a" * (kja W k_1 ) (A-3.10)
Thus the second order condition for the maximization is





a"|i) /W2 ) (a'k(k-l)-a"|iOu) >
which implies a" < (a' k (k-1) ) /[i \i (A-3.11)
Suppose we assume that the base bonus payment, a(F), as the
follows
:
a(F) = Fr7D-S (A-3.12)
where D and S represent management tool used to increase or
decrease the base payment to adjust for changes in target
accession totals, unemployment or other economic conditions.
Then the incentive parameter, b(F) becomes:
b(F) = nF r'"VD (A-3.13
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Additionally, our work effort function, W, based on Equation
(A-3.7) becomes:
W={ (nFn-7D)*!aok/c} 1/(k" 1! ==-» W={nk^ rV (cD) } l/ ^-'--^ (A-3.14)
The Bonus Incentive in the text was developed based on the
risk-averse version of the above case. It incorporates the
recruiter's work effort, risk-averseness and market




APPENDIX F. SAMPLE INCENTIVE TYPE CONTRACT
1. The following example is provided to show how the
incentive contract model would work. It is a Fixed Price
Incentive Type Contract. The numbers used can be
adjusted based upon the contracting officer's opinion and







2. During pre-MSD, the contractor calculates his MTBF. This
calculated MTBF is then compared to the minimum Government
MTBF requirements. Using these two figures, the
contractor and the contracting officer can review the
possible outcomes from table 1.
3. In this first example, the contractor predicts his
product's MTBF to be equivalent to Government Minimum plus
25 percent. After one year of performance, the
contractor's product MTBF is evaluated and the MTBF is
found to be 2 percent below the Government' s minimum
requirements
.




$1,000,000-[$14,000,000 - $13,600,000]*0.3 = $880,000.
Incentive/Penalty (from Table): -$220,000
Price to Government:
$14,000,000 + $880,000 - $220,000 = $14,660,000
Percent Profit to the Contractor:
$660,000 / $14,000,000 = 4.71%
4. In the second example, the contractor predicts his
product's MTBF to be equivalent to Government Minimum plus
25 percent. After one year of performance, the
contractor's product MTBF is evaluated and the MTBF is
found to be as predicted.
Final Negotiated Cost: $14,000,000.
Profit:
$1,000,000 - [$14,000,000 - $13,600,000]*0.3 = $880,000.
Incentive/Penalty (from Table): $558,406
Price to Government:
$14,000,000 + $880,000 + $558,406 - $15,438,406
Percent Profit to the Contractor:
$1,438,406 / $14,000,000 = 10.27%
5. In the third example, the contractor predicts his
product's MTBF to be equivalent to Government Minimum plus
percent. After one year of performance, the
contractor' s product MTBF is evaluated and the MTBF is
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found to be better than his original prediction
(Government Minimum + 35 percent)
.
Final Negotiated Cost: $14,000,000.
Profit:
$1,000,000 - [$14,000,000 - $13, 600, 000]*0.3 = $880,000.
Incentive/Penalty (from Table): $644,969
Price to Government:
$14,000,000 + $880,000 + $644,969 = $15,524,969
Percent Profit to the Contractor:
$1,524,969 / $14,000,000 - 10.89%
6. This final example will be used to show that if the
contractor had predicted his MTBF to be Government Minimum
plus 35 percent, vice 25 percent, his profit would be much
greater. We will assume the contractor has predicted a
MTBF of Government Minimum plus 35 percent. After one
year the contractor' s performance has been evaluated and
his MTBF is found to be meet his original prediction
(Government Minimum plus 35 percent)
.
Final Negotiated Cost: $14,000,000.
Profit:
$1,000,000 - [$14,000,000 - $13, 600, 000]*0.3 = $880,000.
Incentive/Penalty (from Table): $704,969
Price to Government:
$14,000,000 + $880,000 + $704,969 = $15,584,969
Percent Profit to the Contractor:
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$1,584,969 / $14,000,000 = 11.32%
As mentioned in the Besen-Terasawa study, this type of
computation table for assigning incentive awards, lends
itself to truth in predictions. Too many times, the
contractor has assigned Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF)
numbers to the government, only to have actual MTBF be
significantly lower than "advertised." Thus, leaving the
services no option but to buy more of the required parts at a
profit to the contractor. By using this incentive table, the
contractor is using his own values to achieve his future
expected profit. If those numbers are incorrect, the
contractor, not the military services, will be penalized.
Critics may claim that if the contractor is penalized,
then the Government, too, loses out in the form of incorrect
or insufficient part allowancing. The author's answer and
argument is that currently we are allowancing based upon
information provided by the contractor. If that information
is incorrect, only the government loses out The contractor
eventually gains profits by the additional procurements the
Government must make to support the fleet. At a minimum, in
using the Besen-Terasawa "hybrid" the Government "gains" from
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APPENDIX G. TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 24 66 40
-CITE-
10 USC Sec. 2466 01/06/97
-EXPCITE-
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES
Subtitle A - General Military Law
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT
CHAPTER 14 6 - CONTRACTING FOR PERFORMANCE OF CIVILIAN
COMMERCIAL OR INDUSTRIAL TYPE FUNCTIONS
-HEAD-
Sec. 2466. Limitations on the performance of depot-level
maintenance of materiel
-STATUTE-
(a) Percentage Limitation. - Not more than 40 percent
of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a military
department or a Defense Agency for depot-level maintenance
and repair workload may be used to contract for the
performance by non-Federal Government personnel of such
workload for the military department or the Defense Agency.
U.S. Code cited verbatim as found on the U.S. House of
Representatives web site at; http://law2.house.gov/
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Any such funds that are not used for such a contract shall
be used for the performance of depot-level maintenance and
repair workload by employees of the Department of Defense.
((b) Renumbered Sec. 2472(a))
(c) Waiver of Limitation. - The Secretary of the
military department concerned and, with respect to a Defense
Agency, the Secretary of Defense may waive the applicability
of subsection (a) for a fiscal year, to a particular
workload, or to a particular depot-level activity if the
Secretary determines that the waiver is necessary for
reasons of national security and notifies Congress regarding
the reasons for the waiver.
(d) Exception. - Subsection (a) shall not apply with
respect to the Sacramento Army Depot, Sacramento,
California.
(e) Report. - Not later than January 15, 1995, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report
identifying, for each military department and Defense
Agency, the percentage of funds referred to in subsection
(a) that was used during fiscal year 1994 to contract for
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the performance by non-Federal Government personnel of
depot-level maintenance and repair workload.
- SOURCE
-
(Added Pub. L. 100-456, div. A, title III, Sec. 326(a),
Sept. 29, 1988, 102 Stat. 1955; amended Pub. L. 101-189,
div. A, title III, Sec. 313, Nov. 29, 1989, 103 Stat. 1412;
Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title III, Sec. 314(a)(1), Dec. 5,
1991, 105 Stat. 1336; Pub. L. 102-484, div. A, title III,
Sec. 352 (a) -(c), Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2378; Pub. L. 103-
337, div. A, title III, Sec. 332, Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat.
2715; Pub. L. 104-106, div. A, title III, Sec. 312(b), Feb.
10, 1996, 110 Stat. 250.)
-STATAMEND-
REPEAL OF SECTION
For contingent effective date of repeal of this
section by section 311(f) (1) of Pub. L. 104-106, see section
311(f)(3) of Pub. L. 104-106, set out in a Policy Regarding
Performance of Depot-Level Maintenance and Repair for





1996 - Subsec. (b) . Pub. L. 104-106, Sec. 312(b),
redesignated subsec. (b) as section 2472(a) of this title.
1994 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103-337, Sec. 332(a),
amended heading and text of subsec. (a) generally. Prior to
amendment, text read as follows:
'
' (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
Secretary of a military department and, with respect to a
Defense Agency, the Secretary of Defense, may not contract
for the performance by non-Federal Government personnel of
more than 40 percent of the depot-level maintenance workload
for the military department or the Defense Agency.
'
'
(2) The Secretary of the Army shall provide for the
performance by employees of the Department of Defense of not
less than the following percentages of Army aviation depot-
level maintenance workload:
''(A) For fiscal year 1993, 50 percent.
'' (B) For fiscal year 1994, 55 percent.
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''(C) For fiscal year 1995, 60 percent. 1 '
Subsec. (b) . Pub. L. 103-337, Sec. 332(b), inserted
''and repair'' after ''maintenance 1 ' in two places.
Subsec. (e) . Pub. L. 103-337, Sec. 332(c), amended
heading and text of subsec. (e) generally. Prior to
amendment, text read as follows:
'' (1) Not later than January 15, 1992, and January 15,
1993, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air
Force shall jointly submit to Congress a report describing
the progress during the preceding fiscal year to achieve and
maintain the percentage of depot-level maintenance required
to be performed by employees of the Department of Defense
pursuant to subsection (a)
.
''(2) Not later than January 15, 1994, the Secretary
of each military department and the Secretary of Defense,
with respect to the Defense Agencies, shall jointly submit
to Congress a report described in paragraph (1) .''
1992 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102-484, Sec. 352(a),
amended subsec.
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(a) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (a) read as
follows
:
''Percentage Limitation. - Not less than 60 percent of
the funds available for each fiscal year for depot-level
maintenance of materiel managed for the Department of the
Army and the Department of the Air Force shall be used for
the performance of such depot-level maintenance by employees
of the Department of Defense.''
Subsec. (c) . Pub. L. 102-484, Sec. 352(b), substituted
''The Secretary of the military department concerned and,
with respect to a Defense Agency, the Secretary of Defense''
for ''The Secretary of the Army, with respect to the
Department of the Army, and the Secretary of the Air Force,
with respect to the Department of the Air Force, ' '
.
Subsec. (e) . Pub. L. 102-484, Sec. 352(c), designated
existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2)
1991 - Pub. L. 102-190 substituted section catchline
for one which read ''Prohibition on certain depot
maintenance workload competitions'' and amended text
generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: ''The
Secretary of Defense shall prohibit the Secretary of the
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Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, in selecting an
entity to perform any depot maintenance workload, from
carrying out a competition for such selection -
' ' (1) between or among maintenance activities of the




(2) between a maintenance activity of either such
department and a private contractor.''
1989 - Pub. L. 101-189, in introductory provisions,
substituted
''shall prohibit'' for ''may not require'', ''Army and''




Section 331 of Pub. L. 103-337 provided that:
''Congress makes the following findings:
'' (1) By providing the Armed Forces with a critical
capacity to respond to the needs of the Armed Forces for
depot-level maintenance and repair of weapon systems and
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equipment, the depot-level maintenance and repair activities
of the Department of Defense play an essential role in
maintaining the readiness of the Armed Forces.
' ' (2) It is appropriate for the capability of the
depot-level maintenance and repair activities of the
Department of Defense to perform maintenance and repair of
weapon systems and equipment to be based on policies that
take into consideration the readiness, mobilization, and
deployment requirements of the military departments.
1
' (3) It is appropriate for the management of
employees of the depot-level maintenance and repair
activities of the Department of Defense to be based on the
amount of workload necessary to be performed by such
activities to maintain the readiness of the weapon systems
and equipment of the military departments and on the funds
made available for the performance of such workload. '
'
REUTILIZATION INITIATIVE FOR DEPOT-LEVEL ACTIVITIES
Section 337 of Pub. L. 103-337 provided that:
' ' (a) Program Authorized. - The Secretary of Defense
shall conduct activities to encourage commercial firms to
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enter into partnerships with depot-level activities of the
military departments for the purposes of -
'
'(1) demonstrating commercial uses of the depot-
level activities that are related to the principal mission
of the depot-level activities;
'
' (2) preserving employment and skills of employees
currently employed by the depot-level activities or
providing for the reemployment and retraining of employees
who, as the result of the closure, realignment, or reduced
in-house workload of such activities, may become unemployed;
and
'
f (3) supporting the goals of other defense
conversion, reinvestment, and transition assistance programs
while also allowing the depot-level activities to remain in
operation to continue to perform their defense readiness
mission.
' ' (b) Conditions. - The Secretary shall ensure that
activities conducted under this section -
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' ' (1) do not interfere with the closure or
realignment of a depot-level activity of the military
departments under a base closure law; and
11 (2) do not adversely affect the readiness or
primary mission of a participating depot-level activity. '
'
CONTINUATION OF PERCENTAGE LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMANCE OF
DEPOT-LEVEL MAINTENANCE
Pub. L. 103-160, div. A, title III, Sec. 343, Nov.
30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1624, provided that: ''The Secretary of
Defense shall ensure that the percentage limitations
applicable to the depot-level maintenance workload performed
by non-Federal Government personnel set forth in section
2466 of title 10, United States Code, are adhered to.''
EFFECT OF 1992 AMENDMENTS ON EXISTING CONTRACTS
Section 352(d) of Pub. L. 102-484 provided that: ''The
Secretary of a military department and the Secretary of
Defense, with respect to the Defense Agencies, may not
cancel a depot-level maintenance contract in effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act (Oct. 23, 1992) in order
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to comply with the requirements of section 2466(a) of title
10, United States Code, as amended by subsection (a) . '
'
PROHIBITION ON CANCELLATION OF CONTRACTS IN EFFECT ON
DECEMBER 5, 1991
Section 314(a)(3) of Pub. L. 102-190 provided that:
' ' The Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air
Force may not cancel a depot-level maintenance contract in
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act (Dec. 5,
1991) in order to comply with the requirements of section
2466(a) of such title, as amended by subsection (a).''
COMPETITION PILOT PROGRAM; REVIEW AND REPORT
Section 314(b) -(d) of Pub. L. 102-190, as amended by
Pub. L. 102-484, div. A, title III, Sec. 354, Oct. 23,
1992, 106 Stat. 2379, provided that:
"((b) Repealed. Pub. L. 102-484, div. A, title III,
Sec. 354, Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2379.)
'' (c) Review by Comptroller General. - Not later than
February 1, 1994, the Comptroller General shall submit to
Congress an evaluation of all depot maintenance workloads of
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the Department of Defense, including Navy depot maintenance




(d) Report by Secretary of Defense. - Not later than
December 1, 1993, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
Congress a report-
11 (1) containing a five-year strategy of the
Department of Defense to use competitive procedures for the
selection of entities to perform depot maintenance
workloads; and
''(2) describing the cost savings anticipated
through the use of those procedures .'
'
PILOT PROGRAM FOR DEPOT MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD COMPETITION
Pub. L. 101-510, div. A, title IX, Sec. 922, Nov. 5,
1990, 104 Stat. 1627, authorized a depot maintenance
workload competition pilot program during fiscal year 1991,
outlined elements of the program, and provided for a report
not later than Mar. 31, 1992, to congressional defense
committees, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 102-190, div. A,
title III, Sec. 314(b)(2), Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1337.
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TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS
1. Mr. George Ball, Item Manager for F-14D applications,
Naval Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 7 May 1998.
2. Mr. Alan Boyden, Program Manager, Rockwell's Collins
Avionics and Communications Division, Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
8 May 1998.
3. Mr. Norman Canter, Item Manager for F-14D applications,
Naval Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 7 May 1998.
4. Mrs. Dorothy Corbett, Item Manager for AV-8B
applications, Naval Inventory Control Point,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 5 May 1998.
5. Mrs. Pat Gallagher, Item Manager for EA-6B applications,
Naval Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 4 May 1998.
6. Mr. Jim Gillen, Technical Advisor for F-14D applications,
Naval Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 4 May 1998.
7. Mrs. Pam Gray, Contract Specialist (Code A- 2 . 5 . 1 . 4 . 2) ,
Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxet River Maryland, 11 May
1998.
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8. Mr. Jim Lomano, Assistant Helicopter Weapons System
Manager, Naval Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 17 June 1997.
9. Mrs. Lisa Mahoney, Item Manager for H-46 applications,
Naval Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 6 May 1998.
10. Mr. Jim Mockus, Office of the Comptroller, Naval
Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 17
June 1997.
11. Capt. Richard E. Morrison, SC, USN, (Code 3.8), Naval
Air Systems Command, Patuxet River, Maryland, 10 June
1997.
12. Mrs. Marlene Rodgers, Value Engineering, Bell
Helicopter, Fort Worth, Texas, 21 May 1998.
13. Mr. Claud Messamore, Director of Contracts, Sanders-
Lockheed Martin, Nashua, New Hampshire, 22 May 1998.
14. Mrs. Maggie Wilbey, Item Manager for F-14D applications,
Naval Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 12 May 1998.
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